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I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Looking back from 2015, the modem history of same-sex marriage in
the United States begins with the decision of the Hawai'i Supreme Court in
Baehr v. Lewin, which held that unless the state could show a compelling
reason for denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple, the court would
require the issuance of such licenses In Hawai'i, the response was a statute
expressly reserving the definition of marriage to the legislature who then
passed a "reciprocal beneficiary" statute giving some of the legal
consequences of marriage to couples who could not marry.2
The most significant response, however, was a federal statute, the so-
called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), signed into law by President Bill
Clinton on September 21, 1996.' DOMA provided a federal definition of
marriage-marriage involves "one man and one woman"--and stated that no
state was required to recognize any other sort of marriage even if that
marriage was valid in a sister state.4
The Supreme Court of Vermont planted the next milestone on the road
to same-sex marriage with its opinion in Baker v. State, holding that the
denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the "common
benefits" clause of the state constitution and told the legislature that unless it
extended marriage, or at least the benefits of marriage, to same-sex couples
the court would order that marriage licenses be granted.' The result was the
nation's first "civil union" legislation, giving same-sex couples the choice to
enter into a civil union, which gave them all of the rights and responsibilities
of marriage, denying their relationships only the word marriage.6
Then, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in
Goodridge v. Department ofPublic Health that denial of a marriage license
to a same-sex couple lacked a rational basis and violated the equal protection
1. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2. HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C-6 (West 1997).
3. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7,
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
4. Id.
5. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
6. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1202 (West 1999).
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guarantee of the Commonwealth's constitution.' The remedy was remanded
for the entry of an appropriate order, delayed 180 days to give the legislature
the opportunity to act.' The legislature did nothing, and, consistent with the
holding in the case, same-sex couples began to marry on May 17, 2004.1
Today, only eleven years later (and only twenty-one years since the
decision in Baehr v. Lewin), same-sex couples may validly enter into
marriage in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. In addition, a
deeply divided United States Supreme Court struck down section 3 of
DOMA in United States v. Windsor.'o
A. State Cases and Statutes
The states where same-sex unions may be validly celebrated and the
relevant authorities include:
1. Alabama: The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
issued a preliminary injunction in Strawser v. Strange prohibiting the
Alabama attorney general from enforcing the state's ban on same-sex
marriage but stayed the injunction." The stay expired on February 9, 2015,
when both the Eleventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court refused
the state's request to extend the stay, and same-sex couples could then marry;
although, the practical effect of the ruling was complicated by the strong
resistance from the state supreme court and some of the state's probate
judges.12
2. Alaska: Hamby v. Parnell granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment holding the state's ban on same-sex marriage to be
unconstitutional." The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
issued a temporary stay pending consideration by the United States Supreme
Court who denied the request.14 The Ninth Circuit's temporary stay expired
on October 17, 2014, and same-sex couples began marrying on that date."
The appeal to the Ninth Circuit is pending.
3. Arizona: Majors v. Horne declared the state's ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional on October 17, 2014." The state appealed and, on
the request of all parties, the Ninth Circuit ordered the proceedings stayed
7. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
8. Id
9. Id.
10. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
11. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (S.D. Ala. 2015).
12. See id.
13. Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Alaska 2014).
14. Parnell v. Hamby, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014).
15. Id.
16. Majors v. Home, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014).
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until the United States Supreme Court rules in DeBoer v Snyder.17 In the
meantime, the decision invalidating the ban stands and same-sex marriages
are legal in the state.
4. Colorado: The decision by the Tenth Circuit in Kitchen v. Herbert,
striking down Utah's ban on same-sex marriage, applied as well to
Colorado." After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Kitchen, the Attorney General asked the Tenth Circuit to lift its say in Burns
v. Hickenlooper and announced on October 7, 2014, that marriage licenses
would begin to issue that day.19
5. California: Same-sex marriage was recognized in the decision of the
California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, holding that limiting
marriage to different-sex couples is unconstitutional.20 The result in the case
was overturned on November 5, 2008, by the approval of Proposition 8
amending the state constitution to limit marriage to one man and one
woman.21 The California Supreme Court upheld the amendment but refused
to invalidate the marriages that had been performed in the period when same-
sex marriages were legal.22 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California held Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in Perry v. Brown.2 3
Certiorari was granted and the United States Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal on June 26, 2013, in Hollingsworth v. Perry.24 The state immediately
resumed issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
6. Connecticut: The state supreme court held in Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health that denying same-sex couples marriage
licenses violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.25 The decision was handed down on October 28, 2008, and on remand
the superior court issued an order under which marriage licenses would be
issued to same-sex couples beginning on November 12, 2008.26 The
legislature followed suit and enacted marriage equality effective April 23,
17. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom., Bourke v. Beshear,
135 S. Ct. 1041 (2015).
18. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
19. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23,
2014); John Suthers, Colorado Attorney General Tells County Clerks to Begin Issuing Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, COLO. Arr'Y GEN. (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.coloradoattomeygeneral.gov/press/news/
2014/10/07/coloradoattorney general tellscountyclerks begin issuing same sex mamage
20. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
21. Calfornia Proposition 8, the "Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry" Initiative
(2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California Proposition_8,_the_%22EliminatesRight of
Same-Sex Couples to Marry/o22_Initiative (2008) (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
22. See id.
23. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012).
24. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
25. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (2008).
26. Kerrigan & Mock v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. NNH-CV 04-4001813,2008 WL 5203867 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2008) (Trial Order).
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2009.27 At the same time, the legislature repealed the existing civil union
statutes effective October 1, 2010.28 Like other states that have made the
transition from civil union to marriage, Connecticut allowed persons in a civil
union to turn the civil union into a marriage, and remaining civil unions
automatically became marriages on a stated date (October 1, 2010).29 In any
event, the civil union is merged into the marriage as of the date of the
marriage stated in the certificate or as of the automatic merger date.0
7. Delaware: Delaware adopted civil union legislation effective on
January 1, 2012, and legislation giving full marriage equality became
effective on July 1, 2013.1 The statutes also recognize as married for
purposes of Delaware law two "persons of the same gender who are parties
to a legal union other than a marriage" no matter how described so long as
their union was legally entered into, would not be otherwise be prohibited (as
incestuous or bigamous), and carries with it substantially "the same rights,
benefits, protections, responsibilities, obligations and duties as [a
marriage]."32 The civil union legislation has not been repealed, but civil
unions are not to be performed on or after July 1, 2013, and the parties to a
civil union can apply for a marriage license and have the civil union
converted into a marriage without solemnization.33 On July 1, 2014, all
existing civil unions were automatically converted into marriages, and in all
cases, the effective date of the marriage for state law purposes is the date of
the solemnization of the original civil union.34 Civil unions were limited to
persons of the same sex.
8. Florida: Brenner v. Scott held Florida's ban on same-sex marriage to
be unconstitutional." The court stayed its decision until January 5, 2015."
The United States Supreme Court denied an application to extend the stay
pending appeal, and couples began to marry with the expiration of the district
court stay on January 5.38
9. Hawai'i: Hawai'i authorized civil unions beginning on January 1,
2012." On November 13, 2013, the governor signed a bill amending Chapter
572 of Hawai'i Revised Statutes to authorize same-sex marriage, and the new
law came into effect on December 2 of that year.40 The legislation also
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West 2009).
28. See id. §§ 46b-38aa to -38oo.
29. See id. §§ 46b-38qq, -38rr.
30. See id. §§ 46b-38qq, -38rr.
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a) (West 2013).
32. Id.
33. Id §§ 201-18.
34. Id. § 218(c).
35. Id. § 201.
36. Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
37. See id. at 1294.
38. Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 (2014).
39. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West 2012).
40. Id.
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amended section 572-3 of Hawai'i Revised Statutes to recognize marriages
valid where celebrated.4 ' Hawai'i's civil union statute apparently remains
intact, and the legislation expressly does not invalidate existing reciprocal
beneficiary arrangements.42 The reciprocal beneficiary arrangement is
available to any two persons who cannot legally marry, including siblings or
other relatives prohibited from marrying.43 The legislation also provides for
marriages of persons currently in civil unions or reciprocal beneficiary
arrangements." If partners in a civil union marry the "rights, benefits,
protections, and responsibilities" created by the civil union continue through
the marriage and are "deemed to have first accrued as of the first date these
rights existed under the civil union," and the same is true for those rights,
benefits, protections, and responsibilities that were the result of the reciprocal
beneficiary arrangement.4 5 Whether or not this provision means that the
parties are retroactively married as of the date of the civil union is not clear,
especially because the "rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities"
attendant on a civil union are the same as those attendant on a marriage.46
10. Idaho: Latta v. Otter affirmed the district court ruling holding Idaho's
ban unconstitutional.47 After the full United States Supreme Court refused to
continue a stay issued by Justice Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit dissolved its
own stay effective 9 a.m. on October 15, 2014, at which time same-sex
marriage became legal in Idaho.4 8
11. Illinois: The Illinois Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act was
signed by the governor on November 20, 2013, and went into effect on June
1, 2014.4 It was preceded by civil union legislation effective June 1, 2011.5o
The new legislation allows parties to a civil union to apply for a marriage
license at no charge and then have the marriage solemnized; for one year
following the legislation's effect date parties to a civil union may have the
civil union recorded as a marriage without the need for solemnization.5 ' The
marriage begins on the date stated on the marriage certificate, but if the
second option, that is recording of the civil union as a marriage rather than a
new solemnization is used, the marriage is "deemed effective on the date of
the solemnization of the civil union."52 Whether or not a couple who chose
to record the civil union as a marriage rather than have their marriage
41. Id. § 572-3.
42. Id §§ 572B-1 to 11, 572C-1 to 7.
43. Id § 572C-4.
44. Id. § 572-1.7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
48. Otter v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014).
49. S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
50. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/1 to 75/90 (West 2011).
51. Id. at 75/65.
52. Id. at 75/65(b).
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solemnized is retroactively married as of the date of the solemnization of the
civil union is not clear. The same statute states that the successor marriage
to the civil union begins "as of the date stated on the marriage certificate."53
It remains to be seen whether marriage certificates are indeed backdated to
the date of solemnization of the civil union.
Events, however, overtook the effective date of the legislation. On
February 21, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in Lee v. Orr held that Illinois' ban on same-sex marriage was
unconstitutional, but noted that given the procedural posture of the suit it
applied only to Cook County (which includes the city of Chicago).5 4
12. Indiana: Baskin v. Bogan, decided on June 25, 2014, invalidated
Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage.s5 The Seventh Circuit issued an
emergency stay on June 27, creating the brief window for valid marriages
reflected in the chart below.5 6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and on October
6, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari and same-sex
marriages became legal on that date.57
13. Iowa: The Iowa Supreme Court made same-sex marriage legal in Iowa
by its opinion in Varnum v. Brien, holding that denying a marriage license to
a same-sex couple violates state constitutional guarantees of equal protection
of the laws." The decision became effective upon the issuance of proce-
dendo on April 27, 2009.19 The date of the procedendo casts doubt on the
dates given in the Social Security Administration chart, below. The
legislature has not amended the statutes to reflect marriage equality.
14. Kansas: Marie v. Moser, a case begun in an attempt to prevent the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Kitchen from applying in Kansas, resulted in a
preliminary injunction barring Kansas officials from enforcing the state's ban
on same-sex marriage.60 The district court issued a short-term stay pending
appeal.6 1 The Tenth Circuit then denied a stay pending appeal; Justice
Sotomayor granted a temporary stay, which was lifted by the entire court on
November 12, 2014.62 Beginning on that date, at least some counties in the
state began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
53. Id. at 75/65(c).
54. Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014). The December 16, 2013
date in the Social Security Administration chart as the date when same-sex marriages began in Illinois is
difficult to explain.
55. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
56. Id.
57. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
58. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
59. Procedendo, IOWA CT. (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfData/files/Vamum/
procedendoVamum.pdf.
60. Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TJJ, 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. Nov. 4,2014).
61. Id.
62. Moser v. Marie, 135 S. Ct. 511 (2014).
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15. Maine: Same-sex marriage became legal in Maine by referendum on
November 6, 2012, which ratified amendments to the statutes.63  The
approved provisions became effective on December 29, 2012.' Three years
earlier, the voters had rejected a bill passed by the legislature and signed by
the governor allowing same-sex marriage."s Marriage is "gender neutral"
and same-sex marriages valid where celebrated are valid in Maine."6 Maine
still has a domestic partnership regime, which like Wisconsin's described
below, granted only limited rights but was not limited to same-sex couples.67
16. Maryland: Maryland voters approved same-sex marriage by referen-
dum on November 6, 2012.68 The statutory amendments so approved became
effective on January 1, 2013. On February 23, 2010, Maryland's attorney
general issued an opinion in which he stated that same-sex marriages valid
where celebrated are valid under the law of Maryland; the Maryland Court
of Appeals (the state's highest court) affirmed this conclusion in Port v.
Cowan.70
17. Massachusetts: Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex
couples to marry by decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, as noted above.7'
The Goodridge case was decided in 2003, and the holding became effective
on the entry on remand of the trial order on May 17, 2004.72 The
Massachusetts tatutes have not been amended to reflect marriage equality.
18. Minnesota: Amendments to the Minnesota statutes legalizing marriage
between two persons of the same sex became effective on August 1, 2013.7
As amended, section 517.01 defines a civil marriage as a civil contract
between "two persons."74  Throughout the relevant statutes, the term
marriage is now preceded by the word civil."
19. Montana: Rolando v. Fox granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
invalidating Montana's ban on same-sex marriage on November 19, 2014,
and denied the defendants request for a stay.76




66. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 650-A, 650-B (West 2012).
67. Id. tit. 22, § 2710.
68. Maryland, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/maryland (last
visited June 1, 2015).
69. Id.
70. Id; Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md. 2012).
71. History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/history-and-timeline-of-marriage (last updated Jan. 16, 2015).
72. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 01-1647-A, 2004 WL 5064000 (Mass. Super. Ct. May
17, 2004) (Trial Order).
73. H.F. 1054, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013).
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 2013).
75. See, e.g., id. § 517.08.
76. Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014).
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20. Nevada: The district court granted summary judgment in Sevcik v.
Sandoval, denying plaintiffs claims that denial of marriage to same-sex
couples is a violation of a constitutionally protected right.77 On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, Sevcik was consolidated with Latta v. Otter, and reversed.
On October 9, 2014, a permanent injunction issued prohibiting enforcement
of the ban on same-sex marriages and marriages began that same day.
21. New Hampshire: New Hampshire enacted legislation allowing same-
sex couples to marry effective January 1, 2010, defining marriage as the
"legally recognized union of 2 people . . . regardless of gender."79 Marriages
valid where celebrated, so long as they would be valid in New Hampshire,
and civil unions valid where entered into are also recognized as marriages in
New Hampshire.so Civil unions were allowed under New Hampshire law
beginning on January 1, 2008.81 No new civil unions could be established on
or after January 2, 2010; before January 1, 2011, persons in civil unions on
that date may apply for a marriage license and then have the marriage
solemnized, or they may apply and receive a marriage certificate without the
need for solemnization.8 2 On January 1, 2011, all existing civil unions were
deemed to be marriages as of that date.83 Unlike the Illinois and Hawai'i
legislation, this transitional provision does not address directly the issue of
continuity of rights and obligations between the civil union and succeeding
marriage.84 The legislation does state that if the parties to a civil union marry,
with or without solemnization, the civil union is dissolved "as of the date of
the marriage stated in the certificate."" Civil unions still in existence on
January 1, 2011, are "merged" into the successor marriage.86 It is also unclear
whether this provision is substantively different from the dissolution that
occurs on the issuing of a new marriage certificate.87
22. New Jersey: New Jersey was a pioneer in formal domestic partnership
arrangements, enacting enabling legislation in 2004.88 The rights and
obligations of a domestic partnership, which was limited to same-sex couples
and different-sex couples age sixty-two or older, were like but not identical
to those of marriage, and some health and pension benefits were available
only to domestic partners of the same sex who could not marry under state
77. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012).
78. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 465 (9th Cir. 2014).
79. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1a (2010).
80. Id. §§ 457:3, 457:45.
81. New Hampshire Civil Unions, N.H. FREEDOM TO MARRY COALITION, http://www.nhftn.org/
Xtras/civilunions.htrnl (last visited May 1, 2015).
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:3, 457:45.





88. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to -13 (West 2004).
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law.89 The income and estate taxes applied in the same way as they did to
married couples.90 In addition, the statute set out several requirements for
entering into a domestic partnership, including maintaining a common
residence and exhibiting at least one of a statutory list of indicia showing that
the partners were "jointly responsible for each other's common welfare.""
The domestic partnership, at least for same-sex couples, was doomed by
the holding in Lewis v. Harris that equal protection required that same-sex
couples be given the same rights and obligations as married couples.92 In
response, the legislature passed civil union legislation effective February 19,
2007.93 The legislation limited civil unions to two parties of the same sex
and stated that "[p]arties to a civil union shall receive the same benefits and
protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as spouses in a
marriage."94 The legislation also put an end to future domestic partnerships
for same-sex couples as of the effective date.95 However, two persons who
are over sixty-two years of age can still form domestic partnerships.96 The
reason for the exception has to do with Social Security benefits.97 If two
persons receiving Social Security old age pension benefits marry, it is
possible that the benefits they receive as a married couple will be less than
the sum of the individual benefits they received before marriage.98 The
domestic partnership gives such couples the option of a legally recognized
relationship without the possible Social Security complications of being
married.99
The New Jersey civil union was in turn undone by another equal
protection decision of the state courts, Garden State Equality v. Dow.00 The
court held that because the decision in Windsor v. United States gave federal
recognition only to "lawful marriages," couples in New Jersey civil unions
were not afforded the same status as married couples.01 The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted the state's motion for immediate certification for
appeal but unanimously refused to stay the lower court's order that marriage
begin for same-sex couples on October 21.102 The state then withdrew its
89. Id § 26:8A-2(e).
90. Id. § 26:8A-2(d).
91. Id § 26:8A-4(b).
92. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (2006).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-36 (West 2007).
94. Id. § 37:1-29.
95. Id § 26:8A-4.1.
96. Id.
97. Erin Clearly, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the Aftermath of Lewis v. Harris: Should




100. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
101. Id. at 367.
102. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013).
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appeal, and same-sex marriage became a fact in New Jersey on October 21,
2013.
23. New Mexico: Until December 19, 2013, New Mexico was the only state
to have no law on the validity of same-sex marriage.'03 While same-sex
marriage had not been legalized by statute or court decision, neither had the
state enacted a statutory prohibition (usually referred to as a "mini-DOMA"
statute) or a constitutional definition of marriage as a union between one man
and one woman.'" Several counties in the state began issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, some on the initiative of the county clerk and
some because the clerks had been ordered to do so by local courts.0 5 One of
those cases, Griego v. Oliver, resulted in an order finding the denial of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples to be unconstitutional under the state
constitution.0 6  The supreme court accepted a request from the state's
Association of Counties to give a definitive ruling and on December 19,
2013, issued its unanimous opinion in Griego v. Oliver, holding that denying
a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the state constitution's
guarantee of equal protection.o' While marriages entered into after the
decision in Griego are unquestionably valid, the opinion does not deal with
the validity of marriages entered into before the decision.' The decision
expressly did not strike down existing marriage legislation, which the court
found prohibited same-sex couples from marrying, but rather granted a writ
of superintending control mandating the courts to enforce the holding and
rationale of the opinion construing the term civil marriage to mean the union
of two people, which clearly extends marriage to all couples given the
definition of marriage as a civil contract in section 40-1-1 of New Mexico
Statutes.'09 The date of the validity same-sex marriages entered into before
December 19, 2013, is relevant to the federal treatment of those marriages.
24. New York: New York's Marriage Equality Act became effective on
July 24, 2011.110 Beginning on that date, "[a] marriage that is otherwise valid
shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same
or different sex.""' The statue also states:
No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege,
protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from
statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other
103. New Mexico, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/new-mexico
(last visited May 1, 2015).
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Griego v. Oliver, No. D 202 CV 2013 2757, 2013 WL 5768197 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 3, 2013).
107. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871 (N.M. 2013).
108. See id.
109. See id; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-1 (West 2013).
110. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b (McKinney 2011).
111. Id. § 10-a(1).
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source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being or
having been of the same sex rather than a different sex. When necessary to
implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all
gender-specific language or terms hall be construed in a gender-neutral
manner in all such sources of law." 2
New York has recognized same-sex marriages as valid since the decision
of the Fourth Appellate Department in Martinez v. County of Monroe on
February 1, 2008.113 Such marriages were not quite the same as different-sex
marriages.14 Because of the close connection between the federal income
tax and estate tax systems, the New York tax authorities maintained that
same-sex couples whose marriages were recognized in New York could not
file joint income tax returns nor could the estate of the first spouse to die
obtain a marital deduction for estate tax purposes for otherwise qualifying
transfers to the surviving spouse."' This treatment changed with the
enactment of the Marriage Equality Act, and after the United States Supreme
Court decision in Windsor, the state tax authorities decided to allow taxpayers
to amend returns for which the statute of limitations remains open."16
Couples whose marriage was recognized before the passage of the Marriage
Equality Act may file a joint income tax return, and estates of decedents
whose marriages were recognized before passage of the Act may file for an
estate tax refund based on the allowance of a marital deduction for qualifying
transfers to the surviving same-sex spouse.'17
25. North Carolina: Following the denial of certiorari in Bostic v. Schaefer,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina issued a
permanent injunction in General Synod of the United Church of Christ v.
Resinger barring the enforcement of North Carolina laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage."'
112. Id § 10-a(2).
113. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
114. See id
115. See New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, The Marriage Equality Act,
TAXPAYER GUIDANCE DivisioN (July 29, 2011), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/multitax/ml l_8c
8i_7mImctmt_1r_12s.pdf; see also New York State Department of Taxation and Finance,
Implementation of the Marriage Equality Act Related to the New York State Estate Tax, TAXPAYER
GUIDANCE DIvIsION (July 29, 2011), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/estate _&_gift/ml 1 8m.pdf.
116. See New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Information for Same-Sex Married
Couples, TAXPAYER GUIDANCE DIVISION (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/multitax/
ml3_5i_l0m.pdf.
117. See id.
118. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (Oct. 6, 2014);
General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014).
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26. Oklahoma: Bishop v. Smith invalidated Oklahoma's ban on same-sex
marriage."9 With the denial of certiorari on October 6, 2014, same-sex
marriages began in the state.120
27. Oregon: Same-sex marriage has been possible in Oregon since the grant
of summary judgment on May 19, 2014, invalidating Oregon's ban on same-
sex marriage on constitutional grounds in Geiger v. Kitzhaber, which the
state declined to appeal.'21
28. Pennsylvania: The decision in Whitehead v. Wolf, issued on May 20,
2014, invalidated the Commonwealth's statutes banning same-sex
marriage.122 The state declined to appeal.123
29. Rhode Island: Rhode Island's civil union legislation became effective
on July 1, 2011.124 The statute was unusual for including a provision
providing extensive protection to individuals who refuse to "treat as valid"
any civil union because of "sincerely held religious beliefs." 25 In addition,
the legislation included a provision that granted recognition of other state's
civil unions and registered domestic partnerships so long as they do not grant
"the status of marriage." 26 Both of these provisions are substantially more
restrictive that those found in other states' civil union legislation. On May
14, 2012, the governor issued an executive order directing all state agencies.
to recognize same-sex marriages valid where celebrated.127 The next step
came almost exactly one year later when the same governor signed legislation
allowing same-sex couples to marry in Rhode Island beginning on August 1,
2013.128 The legislation also allows those in civil unions to merge the civil
union into a marriage either with or without solemnization of the marriage.129
Under Rhode Island law:
For purposes of determining the legal rights and responsibilities involving
individuals who previously entered into a civil union in this state, and whose
civil union has merged into a marriage under this chapter, the date of the
recording of the marriage certificate shall be the operative date by which
legal rights and responsibilities are determined.30
119. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), ajJ'g Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder,
962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
120. Id
121. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014).
122. Whitehead v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
123. Id.
124. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-3.1-1 to -13 (West 2011).
125. Id. § 15-3.1-5.
126. Id. § 15-3.1-8.
127. Lincoln D. Chafee, Executive Order No. 12-02, Recognition of Out of State, Same-Sex
Marriages, OFF. GOVERNOR (May 14, 2012), http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/executiveorders/
2012/Executive Order 12-02.pdf.
128. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-1 (West 2011).
129. Id. § 15-3.1-12.
130. Id. § 15-3.1-13.
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This provision, at least, clearly means that the marriage begins in every sense
when the certificate of marriage is recorded, whether the marriage is entered
into through solemnization or not.13 '
30. South Carolina: South Carolina's ban on same-sex marriage was held
unconstitutional in Condon v. Haley, decided on November 12, 2014.132 The
district court granted a one-week stay of its injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the state law provisions banning same-sex marriage.3 The
United States Supreme Court denied the request for a stay on November 20,
when marriages began.13 4
31. Utah: Same-sex marriage was legal in Utah from December 20, 2013,
when the decision in Kitchen invalidated Utah's ban on same-sex marriage,
until a stay was granted by the United States Supreme Court on January 6,
2014.11s The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, and with the denial of
certiorari, the Tenth Circuit lifted its stay, issued its mandate that same day,
and same-sex marriage was again legal in the state.3 6
32. Vermont: Vermont was the first state to create civil unions and the first
to allow same-sex couples to marry by enacting legislation that defined
marriage as "the legally recognized union of two people."'3 7 The legislation,
effective September 1, 2009, also states that when the word marriage is used
in any statute the term means a civil marriage.13 1 Unlike other states that
have replaced civil unions with marriage, Vermont did not enact legislation
to deal with the transition from civil union to marriage, but the legislation
creating "civil marriage" did repeal the statutory provisions governing the
issuing of civil union licenses and the solemnization of civil unions."'
33. Virginia: After the denial of certiorari in Bostic v. Schaefer, the Fourth
Circuit lifted its stay, issued its mandate on the same day, and same-sex
marriage became possible in Virginia. 40
34. Washington: Like Maine and Maryland, the state of Washington
legalized marriage equality by popular vote on November 6, 2012.14' The
legislation approved by the voters became effective on December 6, 2012.142
Washington had enacted registered domestic partnership legislation effective
July 22, 2007.143 As in other states that have replaced marriage substitutes
with marriage, registered domestic partnerships can turn into marriages by
131. See id.
132. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014).
I33. Id
134. Wilson v. Condon, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
135. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
136. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (Oct. 6, 2014).
137. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2009).
138. Id.
139. S.B. 115L, § 12, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009).
140. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (Oct. 6, 2014).
141. See History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, supra note 71.
142. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West 2012) (defining marriage).
143. Id §§ 26.60.010-901.
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obtaining a marriage license and solemnizing the marriage." On June 30,
2014, all remaining registered omestic partnerships where the parties are the
same sex became marriages.14 5 The legal date of such successor marriages,
whether solemnized or created by operation of law, is "the date of the original
state registered domestic partnership."1 4 6 However, no doubt in response to
the possible effects of marriage on Social Security benefits, the legislation
exempts domestic partnerships where at least one partner is age sixty-two or
older from automatic merger.147
35. West Virginia: In McGee v. Cole, decided on November 7, 2014, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that West
Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.148 In light of the
denial of certiorari in Bostic, the state announced on October 9, 2014, that it
would not defend the ban on same-sex marriage, and marriages began.14 9
36. Wisconsin: The Wisconsin marriage equality case, Wolf v. Walker,
holding Wisconsin's ban unconstitutional was affirmed in Baskin v. Bogan,
and with the denial of certiorari same-sex marriage became legal in
Wisconsin.so
37. Wyoming: Guzzo v. Meade, decided on October 17, 2014, granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcing the state's ban on same-sex
marriage and granted a stay to allow the state to decide whether or not to
appeal."' The state informed the court on October 21, 2014, that in light of
Kitchen it would not appeal the grant of the preliminary injunction to the
Tenth Circuit.15 2 The court lifted the stay on the same day and marriages
began in the state.'
38. District of Columbia: Marriage became gender neutral in the District
of Columbia on March 9, 2010, under legislation that became effective on
March 3, 2010.154 Legislation recognizing same-sex marriages validly
celebrated elsewhere became effective on July 7, 2009.'15




148. McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068, 2014 WL 5802665 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).
149. Hunter Schwarz, West Virginia Will Stop Defending Bans on Same-Sex Marriage, Governor and
Attorney General Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2014/10/09/wcst-virginia-will-stop-defending-bans-on-same-sex-marriage-govemor-and-attomey-
general-say/.
150. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wisc. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (Oct. 6, 2014).
151. Guzzo v. Meade, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797 (D. Wy. 2014).
152. Id
153. Id.
154. D.C. CODE § 46-401 (West 2010).
155. Id § 46-405.01.
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The information on each state is summarized in the following table
prepared by the Social Security Administration and appearing in the Program
Operations Manual.156
State Date Same-Sex Marriages Were Date Same-Sex
Permitted in the State Marriages from Any
Other State Were
Recognized
Alabama February 9, 2015 February 9, 2015
Alaska October 17, 2014 October 17, 2014
Arizona October 17, 2014 October 17, 2014
California June 16, 2008 - November 4, 2008 June 16, 2008 -
(See GN June 26, 2013 - present November 4, 2008
00210.003B.l.) June 26, 2013 -present
Colorado June 25, 2014 - July 18, 2014 June 25, 2014 - July
(See GN October 6, 2014 - present 18, 2014
00210.003B.2) October 6, 2014 -
present
Connecticut November 12, 2008 November 12, 2008
Delaware July 1, 2013 July 1, 2013
District of March 9, 2010 July 7, 2009
Columbia
Florida January 5, 2015 January 5, 2015
Hawai'i December 2, 2013 December 2, 2013
Idaho October 15, 2014 October 15, 2014
Illinois December 16, 2013 February 21, 2014
Indiana June 25-27, 2014 June 25-27, 2014
(See GN October 6, 2014 - present October 6, 2014 -
00210.003B.3) present
Iowa April 20, 2009 April 30, 2009
Kansas November 12, 2014 November 12, 2014
Maine December 29, 2012 December 29, 2012
Maryland January 1, 2013 February 23, 2010
Massachusetts May 17, 2004 May 17, 2004
Michigan March 21-22, 2014 March 21-22, 2014
(See GN
00210.003B.2.)
Minnesota August 1, 2013 August 1, 2013
Missouri Hold claims involving a same-sex October 6, 2014
marriage celebrated in Missouri per
instructions in GN 00210.005.17
Montana November 19, 2014 November 19, 2014
156. Same-Sex Marriages-Dates States Permitted or Recognized Same-Sex Marriage, Soc. SEC.
ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2015), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfllnx/0200210003.
157. The references to GN numbers are to statements of Social Security Administration policy dealing
with some of the ambiguities caused by the, sometimes, complex relationship between court orders
resulting from cases invalidating bans on same-sex marriage and the actions of state officials.
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Nevada October 9, 2014 October 9, 2014
New January 1, 2010 January 1, 2010
Hampshire
New Jersey October 21, 2013 October 21, 2013
February 19, 2007 -
October 20, 2013
recognizes marriages
from other states as
civil unions
New Mexico August 21, 2013 January 4, 2011
Per GN 00210.005, hold all claims
in which same-sex couples allege a
ceremonial marriage in New
Mexico based on a marriage license
issued by Sandoval County in 2004.
New York July 24, 2011 February 1, 2008
North Carolina October 10, 2014 October 10, 2014
Oklahoma October 6, 2014 October 6, 2014
Oregon May 19, 2014 October 16, 2013
Pennsylvania May 20, 2014 May 20, 2014
Per GN 00210.005, hold all claims
in which same-sex couples allege a
marriage in Pennsylvania based on
a marriage license issued prior to
this date.
Rhode Island August 1, 2013 February 20, 2007
South Carolina November 19, 2014 November 19, 2014
Utah December 20, 2013 - January 6, December 20, 2013 -
(See 6) 2014 January 6, 2014
October 6, 2014 - present October 6, 2014 -
present
Vermont September 1, 2009 September 1, 2009
Virginia October 6, 2014 October 6, 2014
Washington December 6, 2012 December 6, 2012
West Virginia October 9, 2014 October 9, 2014
Wisconsin June 6-13, 2014 June 6-13, 2014
(See GN October 6, 2014 - present October 6, 2014 -
00210.003B.5) present
Wyoming October 21, 2014 October 21, 2014
In some cases, for example, New Mexico, the questions came from the
actions of local, usually county, officials who took it upon themselves to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples even though the legal authority for
doing so was uncertain."' Most of these situations are discussed in the state
specific sections above.
158. See, e.g., New Mexico, supra note 103.
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In addition, the accuracy of this table with respect to the entries for states
where marriage has succeeded civil unions and registered domestic
partnerships through legislation (succession states), is questionable, given the
various rules governing the effective date of successor marriages. For
example, under the Connecticut statute the civil union is merged into the
marriage as of the date marriage stated in the certificate or as of the automatic
merger date.159 In Rhode Island, the date of the recording of the marriage
certificate is the date on which rights and responsibilities are determined.'60
In Illinois, the successor marriage beings on the date stated in the marriage
certificate, but the statute also says that when the successor marriage comes
about by recording a certificate rather than by a new solemnization, the
marriage is "deemed effective" on the date of the civil union.161 In Hawai'i,
the "rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities" created by the civil
union continue through the marriage and are deemed to have begun on the
date they first existed under the civil union.'62 In Delaware, the effective date
of the marriage is the date of the solemnization of the predecessor civil
union.'16 The New Hampshire statute dissolves the civil union as of the date
of the successor marriage as stated on the certificate, but civil unions still in
existence on January 1, 2011, were "merged" into a successor marriage.'6
Vermont has no provision dealing with the effective date issue, and the
Washington statute clearly states that the legal date of successor marriages i
the date of the original registered domestic partnership.165
Whether or not hese differences will have any practical effect remains
to be seen. For state law purposes, the question of when the marriage began
could become relevant on dissolution because it would presumably have an
effect on the date marital property began to be accumulated for purposes of
equitable distribution in common law states and the date community property
began to be accumulated in community property states.166 Note that the
Washington statute "back dates" the marriage to the date of the registered
domestic partnership and, thus, presumably preserves the community
property nature of property accumulated by the couple during the partnership
period.167 The most problematic statute is New Hampshire's which
"dissolves" the civil union as of the date of the marriage, at least when the
marriage is solemnized.168 Does that rule have an effect on the status of
property as marital or separate? In New Mexico the question is more acute.
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-38qq (West 2009).
160. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3.1-12 (West 2013).
161. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/65 (West 2013).
162. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1.7 (2010).
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, § 218 (West 2013).
164. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46 (West 2010).
165. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100 (West 2012).
166. See infra Part IV.
167. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100.
168. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46.
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Marriages were being solemnized in some counties before the supreme
court's decision in Griego.'69 That opinion says nothing about the validity of
those marriages, although it can be argued that because the limitation of
marriage to different-sex couples is unconstitutional those marriages always
were valid.o Finally, the New Hampshire and Delaware statutes provide
that couples who are in a civil union are married in those states."' What is
the date of marriage of a couple that entered into a civil union in Colorado
and then moved to New Hampshire or Delaware? Answers will no doubt be
forthcoming through litigation or otherwise, although the Social Security
Administration has taken an important step by recognizing legal relationships
that give the partners mutual inheritance rights as the equivalent of marriage
for Social Security purposes.172
B. Current Federal Litigationl73
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Windsor said nothing
about the status of same-sex marriage under the federal Constitution.174 More
precisely, the Court did not say that the denial of a marriage license to a same-
sex couple violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The Court had the opportunity to address the question in the
case decided with Windsor, Hollingsworth v. Perry.7 6 However, the Court
dismissed the appeal from the decision of the Ninth Circuit affirming the
district court's finding that Proposition 8, which amended the state
constitution to define marriage as existing only between one man and one
woman, is unconstitutional.'77 Since the decision in Windsor, five federal
circuit courts of appeals have upheld district court decisions invalidating
prohibitions on same-sex marriage:
(a) Latta v. Otter;'78
(b) Baskin v. Bogan;'79
(c) Bostic v. Schaefer;`s
169. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 874 (N.M. 2013).
170. Id.
171. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 218; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46.
172. See infra App. A.
173. See Pending Marriage Equality Cases, LAMBDA LEGAL, www.lambdalegal.org/pending-
marriage-equality-cases, for a complete and up-to-date annotated list of all marriage equality cases
pending in state and federal courts.
174. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
175. Id.
176. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
177. Id.
178. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
179. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (Oct. 6, 2014).
180. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (Oct. 6, 2014).
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(d) Bishop v. Smith;''
(e) Kitchen v. Herbert.'82
The denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on October
6, 2014, brought legal same-sex marriages to all of the states in those circuits.
Only one circuit court of appeals case has upheld a ban on same-sex marriage:
DeBoer v Snyder.'83 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the case on January 16, 2015, "limited to the following questions: 1) Does
the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state
to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?"'84 Presumably,
the decision will settle the question of whether or not the Constitution
requires states to allow same-sex couples to marry.
C. Marriage Substitutes
The Windsor decision refers to equal treatment for "lawful marriages,"
and federal agencies have interpreted this phrase to limit federal recognition
of marriages, a discussion of the federal consequences of marriage follows.'
This was once an important distinction because some states that did not allow
same-sex couples to marry did allow them to enter into legal relationships
that gave all the rights and privileges of marriage."' All those states now
allow same-sex couples to marry.'I"
In addition, at least for purposes of Social Security benefits, legal
relationships granting the partners the right to inherit from one another are
treated as marriages." The Social Security Administration has produced a
chart showing all the states' various marriage equivalent arrangements, the
dates they are effective, and which ones give inheritance rights and qualify
the partners for spousal Social Security benefits.'8 9
181. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (Oct. 6, 2014).
182. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (Oct. 6, 2014).
183. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom., Bourke v. Beshear, 135
S. Ct. 1041 (Jan. 16, 2015).
184. Id.
185. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
186. See id. at 2691.
187. See supra Part 1.A.
188. Important Information About Social Security Benefits for Same-Sex Couples, Soc. SEC. ADMIN.
(May 2014), www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10567.pdf.
189. See infra App. A.
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II. FEDERAL TREATMENT OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AFTER WINDSOR
As noted above, the majority opinion in Windsor invalidates the
statutory provision defining marriage for federal purposes only with respect
to "lawful marriages."l90 The various marriage substitutes are not equivalent
to marriage for federal purposes, either before or after Windsor, with the
exception being for Social Security purposes discussed immediately
above.19 ' The Department of Labor's post-Windsor guidance addressed to
administrators of employee benefit plans sets out the reasons for the lack of
recognition of marriage substitutes:
The terms "spouse" and "marriage," however, do not include individuals in
a formal relationship recognized by a state that is not denominated a
marriage under state law, such as a domestic partnership or a civil union,
regardless of whether the individuals who are in these relationships have the
same rights and responsibilities as those individuals who are married under
state law. The foregoing sentence applies to individuals who are in these
relationships with an individual of the opposite sex or same sex. 192
Therefore, for now, federal recognition is limited to lawful marriages, except
for Social Security purposes, but what is a "lawful" marriage?"l93 Once a
same-sex couple validly marries, are they married for federal purposes until
the marriage ends by death or dissolution, or does it matter where they live
when they interact with the federal government? For example, if a validly
married same-sex couple moves from New York to Texas, do they still file
jointly for federal income tax purposes, and if one makes a gift to the other
and one of the spouses dies, is there a gift or estate tax marital deduction?
The answer is that for most federal programs and functions, once a couple is
married, they are married no matter where they live.194 The following
summarizes the legal situation as of February 2015.
A. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service
The United States Treasury and the IRS have decided to use a "place of
celebration standard" so that once married the same-sex couple is treated as
a married couple no matter where they live.'9 5 Revenue Ruling 2013-17,
190. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
191. See Important Information About Social Security Benefits for Same-Sex Couples, supra note 188.
192. Technical Release No. 2013-04, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (Sept. 18, 2013), http://dol.gov/ebsa/
newsroom/tr1l3-04.html.
193. See id
194. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
195. Id; I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
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jointly issued by the Treasury and the IRS, was the first statement on the issue
and, as mentioned, uses a place of celebration standard.196
A couple may choose either the married filing jointly or married filing
separately income tax filing status.'97 The estate and gift tax marital
deductions are available for transfers that satisfy the requirements of sections
2056 and 2523 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) (so long as the donee
spouse is a U.S. citizen).' The spouses are in the same generation for
generation skipping transfer tax purposes, and generation assignment of
lineal descendants of one spouse's grandparents with respect to the other
spouse is the same as their generational assignment with respect to the spouse
to whom they are related.'99 For example, Bill and Sebastian enter into a
lawful marriage in New York before the date of the Windsor decision. Bill
is an only child but Sebastian has a niece and nephew who are fifty-six years
younger than Bill. If the marriage is not recognized for purposes of federal
taxation, the niece and nephew are not skip persons with regard to Sebastian
because they are related; however, they are skip persons with regard to Bill
because as nonrelatives their generational assignment is based on the number
of years between their births and Bill's and because that number is more than
37V2 years they are two generations younger than Bill and are skip persons.200
Once the marriage is recognized they are not skip persons with regard to Bill
because they are not skip persons with regard to their uncle.201
Employer-paid health insurance premiums for coverage of the
employee's same-sex spouse are not included in taxable income.202 Validly
married same-sex couples are also married for purposes of employee benefit
plans governed by ERISA, meaning that the employee must take any pension
benefit as a qualified joint and survivor annuity (QJSA) if the plan is a
defined benefit, money-purchase plan, or target benefit plan, otherwise the
spouse must be the beneficiary of other types of plans unless the other spouse
waives his or her right to the pension benefit.203
Finally, because the Supreme Court held that section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional, the statute is void ab initio; it simply never was.20
Therefore, same-sex married couples are entitled to obtain refunds based on
amended returns, open years, or claims for refunds.205 Generally speaking,
because income tax returns remain open for the longer of three years from
the date the return was due, or actually filed if an extension was granted, or
196. Rev. Rul. 2013-17; I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (2012).
197. Rev. Rul. 2013-17; I.R.C. § 2651(b), (c) (2012).
198. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(d), 2523(i).
199. Id § 2651(b), (c).
200. Id. § 2651(d).
201. Id § 2651.
202. See id § 106; Rev. Rul. 2013-17.
203. Rev. Rul. 2013-17; I.R.C. § 1003 (2012).
204. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
205. Rev. Rul. 2013-17.
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for two years from the date the tax was paid, readjustments will not happen
for income tax years before 201 0206 The same three-year limit generally
applies to estate and gift tax returns as well.207 The result may be different if
proper protective claims were timely made.208
Notice 2013-61, issued September 23, 2013, deals with employment
taxes and provides procedures for employers who wish to make claims for
refunds or credits.209 The most common situation involves employer-paid
health insurance for the employee's same-sex spouse and sums paid by the
employee for the spouse's coverage.210 The former are excludible from gross
income and the latter may be paid on a pre-tax basis through a salary
reduction.2 1' Both arrangements affect the amount of the employee's wages
subject to FICA, and once the employee's marriage to the same-sex spouse
is recognized for federal taxation purposes, the amount of employment taxes
owed with respect to that employee may be reduced.212
Notice 2014-1, issued December 17, 2013, deals with cafeteria plans
and health savings accounts.213  The notice provides guidance on when
employers may recognize the valid same-sex marriages of their employees
for purposes of making changes in elections governing cafeteria plans and
health savings accounts.2 14 Consistent with Revenue Ruling 2013-17, an
employee's marital status is determined by whether or not the employee is a
party to a marriage valid where celebrated, regardless of whether or not the
employee and the spouse reside in a state that recognizes the marriage.215
Notice 2014-19, issued April 5, 2014, explains the application of the
Windsor decision and the provisions of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 to qualified
plans.216 The notice states that operation of any qualified plan must reflect
"the outcome of Windsor as of June 26, 2013."217 This requirement means
that plans whose documents define a marital relationship by reference to
section 3 of DOMA, or in some other way that excludes same-sex married
couples, must be amended by the later of the applicable deadline under
section 5.05 of Revenue Procedure 2007-44, or December 31, 2014.218 A
governmental plan need not be amended "before the close of the first regular
206. See I.R.C. § 6511 (2012).
207. See id.
208. See id.; Rev. Rul. 2013-17.




213. I.R.S. Notice 2014-1, 2014-2 I.R.B. 270.
214. Id.
215. Id.; Rev. Rul. 2013-17.
216. I.R.S. Notice 2014-19, 2014-47 I.R.B. 979.
217. Id.
218. Id.; Rev. Proc. 2007-44, 2007-28 I.R.B. 54, § 5.05 (an interim amendment generally must be
adopted by the later of the end of the plan year in which the change is first effective, or the due date of the
employer's tax return for the tax year that includes the date the change is first effective, i.e. June 26, 2013).
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legislative session of the legislative body with the authority to amend the plan
that ends after December 31, 2014.",219 The notice also states that a plan
sponsor may select a date before June 26, 2013, to begin to recognize same-
sex marriages but an amendment will be needed to do so, and the notice
cautions that such an amendment may be difficult to implement "and may
create unintended consequences."2 20  An amendment may be limited to
recognizing same-sex marriages before June 26, 2013, for only certain
purposes, for example, "solely with respect to the QJSA and QJSA
requirements of section 401(a)(1 1) and, for those purposes, solely with
respect o participants with annuity starting dates or dates of death on or after
a specified date."2 21 The notice states:
For Federal tax purposes, the terms "spouse," "husband and wife,"
"husband," and "wife" do not include individuals (whether of the opposite
sex or the same sex) who have entered into a registered domestic
partnership, civil union, or other similar formal relationship recognized
under state law that is not denominated as a marriage under the laws of that
state, and the term "marriage" does not include such formal relationships.222
Again, based on the governing statute, the Social Security Administration has
taken a different position.2 23 The promised guidance on mid-year amendment
of plans to comply with Notice 2014-19 was given in Notice 2014-37.224
B. Department ofLabor
The Department of Labor has issued two guidance documents dealing
with the legal consequences of Windsor, one of which uses the place of
celebration standard to determine if an employee is married, the other uses a
"state of residence standard." The place of celebration standard applies to
employee benefit plans and ERISA.2 25 Technical Release 2013-04, issued
September 18, 2013, makes it clear that where "the Secretary of Labor has
authority to issue regulations, rulings, opinions, and exemptions in title I of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, as well as in the Department's
regulations at chapter XXV of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations,"
the word spouses are two people lawfully married under the law of any state




223. See Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims, Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.secure.
ssa.gov/poms.nsfllnx/02002 10000.
224. I.R.S. Notice 2014-37, 2014-24 I.R.B. 1100.
225. Technical Release 2013-04, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsal
newsroom/trl3-04.html.
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and that marriage includes "a same-sex marriage that is legally recognized
as a marriage under any state law." 2 26
These definitions mean that once a couple is legally married each spouse
has rights in the other's pension plan, if one exists.227 Generally, that right
consists of being the beneficiary of a qualified joint and survivor annuity or
the sole beneficiary of the plan on the employee's death, depending on the
type of plan.22 8 These rights can be waived, but they survive divorce.229
It's worth noting that the word "'state' means any state of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Northern Mariana Islands, any other
territory or possession of the United States, and any foreign jurisdiction
having the legal authority to sanction marriages."230
The place of residence standard applies to the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA).2 31 Fact Sheet #28F released by the Wages and Hours Division
of the Department of Labor in August 2013 defines spouse "as a husband or
wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in the
state where the employee resides, including 'common law' marriage and
same-sex marriage."2 32 The FMLA requires that employers allow employees
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year to care for an ill family member,
including a spouse, and for other family-related reasons such as the birth or
adoption of a child.233
Fact Sheet #28F does not state any reason for adopting a place of
residence standard, and it is not known whether the use of the place of
celebration standard in Technical Release 2013-04, which was issued after
Fact Sheet #28F, superseded the earlier pronouncement.2 34 The question was
presumably laid to rest in February 2015 when the Department announced
the completion of the rulemaking process and the issuing of a final rule
226. Id. These definitions are identical to those in Revenue Ruling 2013-17. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-
38 I.R.B. 201.




231. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012).
232. Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet #28F: Qualifying Reasons for Leave Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (Aug. 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs
28f.pdf.
233. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
234. See Wage & Hour Division, supra note 232.
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changing to the place of celebration standard for FMLA purposes.235  The
new regulation, however, was held invalid in Texas v. U.S.23 6
C. The Social Security Administration
On August 8, 2013, the Social Security Administration promulgated a
new section of the Program Operations Manual System (POMS), Part 02,
Chapter 002, Subchapter 10, entitled "Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims,"
which adopts a place of residence standard for determining eligibility for
spousal benefits under Social Security.237 The original release has been
amended several times and the information it contains is now found in several
different sections of the POMS.238
The new policy applies to all claims filed on or after June 26, 2013, the
date of the Windsor decision, and claims that were pending final
determination on that date.239 It allows payment of claims when the person
on whose earning record the claim is being made (the "Number Holder" or
"NH" in the release) "was married in a state that permits same-sex marriage
[and] is domiciled at the time of application, or while the claim is pending a
final determination, in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage."240
Although the instructions do not make an express reference to the
definition of spouse in the Social Security Act, they are compatible with
subsection (h)(1)(A) governing the determination of who is a spouse or
surviving spouse, which states:
(i) An applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or widower of a fully or
currently insured individual for purposes of this title if the courts of the State
in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files
an application, or, if such insured individual is dead, the courts of the State
in which he was domiciled at the time of death, or, if such insured individual
is or was not so domiciled in any State, the courts of the District of
Columbia, would find that such applicant and such insured individual were
235. Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Amend the Definition ofSpouse in the Family
Medical Leave Act Regulations, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (Feb. 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmila/spouse/
factsheet.htm. The new regulations will become effective March 27, 2015, and will be found in 29 C.F.R.
pt. 825. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100-803 (2015). The rulemaking process and the rule itself are explained in
the Federal Register for February 25,2015. See Definition ofSpouse Under the Family and Medical Leave
Act, FED. REGISTER (Feb. 25, 2015), https:/federalregister.gov/a/2015-03569.
236. Texas v. United States, No. 7:15-cv-00056-O, 2015 WL 1378752 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2015).
237. See GN 00210.000 Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims, Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210000.
238. See id.
239. GN 00210.001 Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims-Introduction, Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 6,
2013), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210001.
240. GN 00210.705 Same-Sex Marriage - Medicare Based on End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD),
Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (July 7, 2014), https:/secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210705.
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validly married at the time such applicant files such application or, if such
insured individual is dead, at the time he died.
(ii) If such courts would not find that such applicant and such insured
individual were validly married at such time, such applicant shall,
nevertheless be deemed to be the wife, husband, widow, or widower, as the
case may be, of such insured individual if such applicant would, under the
laws applied by such courts in determining the devolution of intestate
personal property, have the same status with respect to the taking of such
property as a wife, husband, widow, or widower of such insured
individual.241
It is this provision that has led the Social Security Administration to
recognize legal relationships other than marriage as conferring the status of
spouse for Social Security purposes. Section 416(h)(1)(A)(ii) deems an
applicant to be the spouse or surviving spouse of an insured individual if
under the laws of the state in which the applicant is domiciled, the applicant
has the same status in intestate succession to the individual as a spouse
would.242 This provision raises the possibility that the survivor of a civil
union or a registered domestic partnership who has the rights of a surviving
spouse for purposes of distribution of the applicant's estate in intestacy is a
spouse or surviving spouse for Social Security purposes.243
The first step, then, in making a determination on a claim by a same-sex
spouse or surviving spouse of an insured individual (the NH) is to determine
the state of domicile of the NH.2" If the NH's domicile is or was the same
state in which the marriage was performed and that state permits same-sex
marriage, and the application date is on or after the date on which same-sex
marriage was permitted in that state, the claim can be processed; the next step
being determining the length of the marriage.2 45
If the NH is or was not domiciled in the state where the marriage was
performed but was married in one of the states permitting same-sex marriage
on or after the date shown in the chart, was domiciled in one of the states
recognizing same-sex marriages before a final determination on the claim,
and the application date is on or after the date the state of domicile recognized
same-sex marriages wherever performed, then the claim can be processed.246
If all of the conditions are not met, the claim is "held."247
241. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012).
242. See id. § 416(h)(1)(A)(ii).
243. See id.
244. GN 00210.002 Same-Sex Marriage-Determining Marital Status for Title II and Medicare
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The release makes it clear that the length of the marriage is measured
from the date the couple was married and is not determined by the date of the
Windsor decision.248 Furthermore, the date of the Windsor decision does not
have anything to do with determining the "date of entitlement"; that
determination is governed by the date of filing the application.2 49 That
conclusion is surely correct because section 3 of DOMA was found to be
unconstitutional.
1. Examples of claims where there is a marriage that can be recognized
for purposes of determining entitlement
1. Allison (the NH) and Liz (the claimant) marry in Massachusetts
(MA) after MA permits same-sex marriage. They are domiciled in MA.
Liz files for aged spouse's benefits on Allison's record while they are
domiciled in MA. The marriage can be recognized for purposes of
determining entitlement for Title II and Medicare benefits. Accordingly,
process the case under the instructions set out in GN 00210.100.
2. Sheldon (the NH) and James (the claimant) are domiciled in Georgia
(GA) when they marry while on vacation in MA after MA permits same-
sex marriage. James files for aged spouse's benefits on Sheldon's record
while they both live in GA. While the application is pending, James and
Sheldon move to and become domiciled in MA. Because they became
domiciled in MA while the application is pending, the marriage can be
recognized for purposes of determining entitlement for Title II and
Medicare benefits. Accordingly, process the case under the instructions set
out in GN 00210.100.
2. Examples of claims where the marriage cannot be recognized for
purposes of determining entitlement
1. Lily (the NH) and Wendy (the claimant) consider themselves
married based on a ceremony celebrated in Washington (WA) state on
August 23, 2010 (before WA permitted same-sex marriage). They are
currently domiciled in WA. Wendy files a claim to receive aged spouse's
benefits from Lily's record. Because the ceremony occurred before WA
permitted same-sex marriage, the NH and claimant cannot be recognized as
married for purposes of determining entitlement to Title II benefits or
Medicare. Accordingly, process the case under the instructions set out in
GN 002 10.100.
2. John (the NH) and Dave (the claimant) married in New York on
October 1, 2012. John died on January 31, 2013, while domiciled in
Minnesota (MN), and Dave filed for surviving spouse benefits. Because
the date of John's death was before the date that MN recognized same-sex
marriages, the NH and claimant cannot be recognized as married for
248. See GN 00210.400 Same-Sex Marriage-Benefits for Surviving Spouses, Soc. SEC. ADMIN.
(Sept. 8, 2014), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210400.
249. See GN 00210.002 Same-Sex Marriage-Determining Marital Status for Title II and Medicare
Benefits, supra note 244.
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purposes of determining entitlement to Title II or Medicare benefits.
Accordingly, process the case under the instructions set out in GN
00210.400.250
As these examples clearly show, the critical datum is the domicile of the
NH, the person whose earning record is the basis of the claim.2 51 Assuming
a valid marriage, so long as the NH is domiciled in a state that recognizes
same-sex marriage when the application is filed, or if not, becomes domiciled
in a state recognizing the marriage before a final determination of the claim,
the marriage will be recognized for determining Social Security benefits.25 2
This application of the rule would seem to have been complicated in the
succession states whose treatment of marriage substitutes differ, as described
above and in the following chart.253 If the successor marriage really is
effective as of the date of the predecessor civil union, as it arguably is in
Delaware, or registered domestic partnership, as it is in Washington State,
did the state "recognize" same-sex marriage as of that date? And what about
the statutes that "merge" the predecessor elationship into the marriage? If
in at least some of these states the result, for state law purposes, is a nunc pro
tunc recognition of same-sex marriage, does the holding in Windsor require
the federal government to recognize that result? Until June 2014, the only
response was "time will tell," but on July 20, 2014, the Social Security
Administration issued a release taking the position that legal relationships
that provide the partners with inheritance rights do make the partners spouses
for Social Security purposes, basing the conclusion on section 416(h)(1) of
the IRC.25 4
Spousal benefits under Social Security are significant and include an
entitlement to a benefit equal to one-half of the other spouse's benefit.255 The
rules and strategies for claiming these benefits are complex, and in some
cases they are not eliminated by divorce.
D. Federal Employment Benefits (Office of Personnel Management)
Benefits for employees of the federal government that are related to




253. See supra Part IA, C; Non-Marital Legal Relationships (Such as Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships), Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (May 19, 2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsflInx/
0200210004.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (2012); Non-Marital Legal Relationships (Such as Civil Unions and
Domestic Partnerships), supra note 253.
255. Retirement Planner: Benefits for Your Spouse, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.govretire2/
yourspouse.htm#a0=0 (last visited May 1, 2015).
256. Benefits Administration Letter 13-203, OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (July 17, 2013), http://www.
opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/benefits-administration-letters/2013/13-203.pdf
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Administration Letter #13-203, issued July 17, 2013, states that valid
marriages in existence on the date of the Windsor decision are considered
new marriages and that all same-sex marriages will be recognized as valid
marriages "regardless of an employee's or annuitant's state of residency."25 7
The letter reiterates the rule of other federal agencies that recognition applies
only to marriages and not to marriage substitutes: "Therefore, same-sex
couples who are in a civil union or other forms of domestic partnership other
than marriage will remain ineligible for most Federal benefits programs. "258
E. Department ofDefense
In News Release 581-13, issued by the Department of Defense on
August 14, 2013, the Department of Defense announced that it would use a
place of celebration standard in determining whether the spouse of a service
member or of a civilian employee is eligible for spousal benefits.259 These
benefits include basic housing allowance, health care under the TRICARE
program, and family separation allowance.260  Entitlement to benefits for
those married on the date of the Windsor decision, June 26, 2013, begins on
that date.26 1 For military personnel stationed in states that do not recognize
same-sex marriage, the Department will allow nonchargeable leave to travel
to a state where marriage to a partner is possible.262
While some states where same-sex marriage is not recognized would
not issue spousal identification cards to same-sex spouses of members of the
state's National Guard, all have now complied, albeit with some restrictions
on state facilities issuing identification cards.2 63
F. Department of Veteran Affairs
On August 4, 2013, the Attorney General wrote to congressional eaders
saying that he executive branch would move to provide veterans' benefits to
same-sex spouses of veterans on the same basis as different-sex spouses in
spite of the language in Title 30 of the U.S. Code restricting recognition of
marriages to those involving one man and one woman.2 64  The benefits
257. See id.
258. See id.






264. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House
of Representatives (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/150/opa/resources/5572013941
51530910116.pdf.
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involved are disability and survivor benefits and the right to joint burial in a
veterans' cemetery.2 65
Whether or not a marriage exists is determined by the place of residence
standard applied as of the date of the marriage or when the right to benefits
accrued.266 The definition of surviving spouse in section 103(c) of the U.S.
Code states that the marriage of a veteran and his or her spouse "shall be
proven as valid for the purposes of all laws administered by the Secretary
according to the law of the place where the parties resided at he time of the
marriage or the law of the place where the parties resided when the right to
benefits accrued."2 67 Presumably, this definition means that a veteran and his
or her partner, living in a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage,
who make a trip to a state that recognizes same-sex marriage, are married
there, and then return home, are not married for purposes of veterans'
benefits.268
G. Department of State and United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS)
In a series of FAQs released shortly after the Windsor decision, both the
Department of State and the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security)
announced that they would recognize a place of celebration standard for all
visa and immigration questions.2 69 The Department of State in fact goes a bit
beyond place of celebration, announcing in its FAQs that if a U.S. citizen is
engaged to be married to a foreign national of the same sex whose country of
citizenship will not allow them to marry, the couple can obtain a fianc6(e)
(K) visa for the noncitizen intended spouse.270 The USCIS also announced
that it would immediately reopen cases where relief was denied because of
section 3 of DOMA.2 71
H. Department ofJustice
On February 8, 2014, the Attorney General made a speech at the annual
dinner of the Human Rights Campaign announcing that on February 10 he
would issue policies to insure that validly married same-sex couples receive
265. See id.
266. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2012).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Spouses, DEP'T STATE, http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
DOMA/DOMA%20FAQs.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015); Janet Napolitano, Same-Sex Marriages, U.S.
CITIZEN & IMMIGR. SERVICES (July 1, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/family/same-sex-marriages.
270. U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Spouses, supra note 269.
271. Janet Napolitano, supra note 269.
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the same treatment as different-sex couples in all of the work of the
Department of Justice on a place of celebration basis.272
The memorandum was indeed released on February 10, 2014.273 The
memorandum deals first with "Implementation by Department
Components."274 This section states how various components of the
Department have released guidance on complying with policy of treating
same-sex couples equally: divisions of the Department of Justice that
administer benefit and compensation programs, uch as the Public Safety
Officers' Benefit Program, will use a place of celebration standard to decide
the validity of a marriage; the United States Trustee Program has issued
guidance to personnel to apply the Bankruptcy Code and rules to all married
couples lawfully married in the jurisdiction where the marriage occurred; the
Bureau of Prisons will likewise recognize the validity of a marriage valid
where celebrated, no matter the residence of the spouse of a prisoner or the
place where the prisoner is incarcerated; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives "will treat same-sex surviving spouses in the same
manner as opposite-sex surviving spouses for purposes of carrying on a
deceased spouse's licensed firearms or explosives business."275
The memorandum next deals with Department policy and states that it
is the Department's policy to recognize same-sex marriages valid where
celebrated to the widest extent possible, including in the interpretation of
statutes and regulations and in evaluating invocations of the spousal
evidentiary privileges.276
I. Judicial Developments in Federal Recognition Before and After the
Denial of Certiorari in 4th, 7th, 9th and 10th Circuits' Cases on October 6,
2014
In Cozen O'Connor v. Tobits, the decedent and her spouse married in
Canada four years before the decedent's death.277 The couple resided in
Illinois where the decedent was a partner in a law firm and participated in its
pension plan, which of course is governed by ERISA.2 78 After the decedent's
death both her surviving spouse and her parents claimed the death benefits
272. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Human Rights
Campaign (Feb. 8, 2014); see Attorney General Makes Landmark Announcement from HRC NY Gala
Stage, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/attomey-general-makes-
landmark-announcement-from-hrc-ny-gala-stage.
273. Department Policy on Ensuring Equal Treatment for Same-Sex Married Couples, OFF. Arr'Y




277. Cozen O'Connor v. Tobits, No. 11-0045, 2013 WL 3878688, at *1 (E.D. Penn. July 29, 2013).
278. Id. at *4.
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under the plan.279  Because the default beneficiary under the plan is a
surviving spouse first and then, if there is no spouse, the participant's
surviving parents or parent, the case turned on whether the surviving spouse
was the surviving spouse for purposes of the plan.280 The court answeredyes,
relying on Windsor and ERISA preemption of Pennsylvania law under which
the plan was organized (and which does not recognize same-sex marriage).2 81
However, the applicability of the holding to other cases is questionable
because the court also noted that under the law of Illinois the marriage was
recognized as a civil union and that an Illinois court had already recognized
the surviving spouse as the decedent's "surviving spouse" under Illinois
law.282 Therefore, it is not clear whether the result would have been the same
had the couple been residents of a state that did not recognize their marriage
in any way.283
In Roe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, the plaintiffs employer's
health insurance plan expressly excluded same-sex spouses from spousal
benefits.284 Plaintiff was denied coverage for her same-sex spouse whom she
married after the state (New York) enacted legislation allowing same-sex
couples to marry.285 Plaintiff sued claiming discrimination and breach of
fiduciary duty in violation of sections 501 and 404 of ERISA.286 The district
court dismissed the suit and the Second Circuit affirmed because the plaintiff
failed to allege any right under the plan with respect to which the employer
had discriminated and because the plaintiff had not adequately alleged any
breach of fiduciary duty.287 The district court distinguished Cozen
O'Connor: "In that case, in the absence of a definition of 'spouse' in the plan,
and in light of the recognition of the marriage as valid of the state of the
couple's domicile (Illinois), the federal government must interpret ERISA as
recognizing that marriage."288 The express exclusion of same-sex spouse in
the plan at issue was the distinguishing difference.289 The district court held,
however, and the Second Circuit agreed, that the opinion "does not address
whether the plan exclusion is constitutional or otherwise lawful under any
other federal or state laws."290
In In re Fonberg, the executive committee of the Judicial Council of the
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of a former employee of the federal court for the
279. Id. at *1.
280. Id.
281. Id. at *3-4.
282. Id at *4.
283. Id.
284. Roe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 12-cv-04788, 2014 WL 1760343, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 1, 2014), aff'd, 589 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2014).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *6-8.
288. Id. at *7.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *9.
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district of Oregon who made a claim for back wages to compensate her for
the expense of providing health insurance for her same-sex registered
domestic partner (under Oregon law) after the federal Office of Personnel
Management refused to treat the partner as a spouse for employee benefit
purposes.29 1 The judges held that the denial of benefits involved unlawful
discrimination in two ways:
Fonberg and her partner are treated differently in two ways. First, they are
treated differently from opposite-sex partners who are allowed to marry and
thereby gain spousal benefits under federal law. This is plainly discri-
mination based on sexual orientation, which the District of Oregon's EDR
[Employee Dispute Resolution] Plan prohibits. They are also treated
unequally vis-i-vis same-sex couples in other states in the circuit, who may
marry and thus gain benefits under Windsor. This violates the principle that
federal employees must not be treated unequally in the entitlements and
benefits of federal employment based on the vagaries of state law. Here,
Oregon law suffers from precisely the same deficiency that the Supreme
Court identified in Windsor with respect to the Defense of Marriage Act.
Both these forms of discrimination are prohibited under the Oregon EDR
Plan.292
The holding in this employee discrimination case is certainly limited to
federal employees, but it could be the first opening to treating all persons in
"marriage substitutes" who by law are given the same rights and obligations
as married persons in the same way the law treats persons in lawful
marriages.293 Just when one might think that the story of same-sex marriage
is on its way to its denouement, another plot line may still be very much alive.
Granted, extending the status of lawfully married spouses to persons in a
legal relationship defined by statute to be the same as marriage in all but name
will not necessarily lead to anything drastically new, but it may help more
same-sex couples gain legal security, and Social Security as well.
III. DISSOLUTION
Some marriages end in divorce, and it is unlikely that marriages between
persons of the same sex will be any different. Planning for divorce is not at
all unusual; prenuptial agreements are often entered into with just such that
possibility in mind.29 4 What has not been so common, at least since the mid-
291. In re Fonberg, 736 F.3d 901,902 (9th Cir. 2013).
292. Id. at 902-03.
293. See id
294. 8 Reasons Why You Should Get a Prenuptial Agreement, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS,
http://www.prenuptialagreements.org/why-get-prenupt/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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twentieth century, is planning for obtaining a divorce.2 95 While once limited
grounds for divorce in state X led one spouse to go to state Y to remain long
enough to acquire residency and give the courts of state Yjurisdiction to grant
a divorce on grounds unavailable at home (state Y might also be a foreign
jurisdiction like Mexico or the Dominican Republic), today divorce is widely
available to United States married couples without the need to forum shop.
The previous sentence has to be amended to read "married different-sex
couples." It is at least possible that courts of a state that does not recognize
same-sex marriage will not accept jurisdiction and dissolve a same-sex
marriage valid where contracted.296 This puts the married same-sex couple
resident in a nonrecognition state in a terrible bind. A couple that lives in a
state that refuses to grant them a divorce will be forced to travel to another
state that will grant it, however that will require living in that state for some
period of time, something that may be impossible for either spouse.29 7
Although academic commentators have worked hard to craft arguments
that would allow the courts of nonrecognition states to take subject matter
jurisdiction of divorces of same-sex married couples, no matter how well
crafted the arguments getting them accepted is an uphill battle given existing
precedent.29 8 In addition, as one commentator has noted, do you really want
your clients to have to go to an appellate court to get divorced?2 99
Nonetheless, the supreme court of one nonrecognition state, Wyoming,
has decided that the state courts may take subject matter jurisdiction of
divorces of same-sex married couples, relying on the Wyoming statute that
makes marriages valid if legally performed.30 0 It must be noted, however,
that while Wyoming statutes define marriage as a contract between one man
and one woman, there is neither a statutory nor a constitutional prohibition
on recognizing same-sex marriages valid where celebrated.3 01
As of early February 2015, the Supreme Court of Texas has not yet
decided its analogue of Christiansen. On August 23, 2013, the court granted
review of the court of appeals decision In re Marriage ofJ.B. andH.B., which
held that the Texas courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
divorce of a same-sex couple whose marriage is valid where celebrated.302
Also on August 23, 2013, the court granted review of the court of appeals
295. See Robert Pagliarini, Divorce Financial Planner: 3 Common Fears, CBS (Aug. 23, 2013, 7:24
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/divorce-financial-planner-3-common-fears/.
296. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. App-Dallas 2010, pet.
granted).
297. See id
298. See Tracy A. Thomas, Same-Sex Divorce, 5 CAL. L. REv. CIRcur 218 (2014); Mary Patricia
Bryn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (2012).
299. See Bryn & Holcomb, supra note 298.
300. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111 (West 2013); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo.
2011).
301. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (West 2013).
302. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. granted).
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decision in State v. Naylor, which held that the state could not intervene and
appeal a district court decision granting a divorce to a same-sex couple whose
marriage was valid where celebrated.303 The court heard arguments on
November 5, 2013, and as of this writing a decision is pending.
Several nonrecognition states have constitutional or statutory
prohibitions on granting divorces to validly married same-sex couples:
1. Alaska: Section 25.05.013 of Alaska Statutes makes contractual rights
granted by a valid same-sex marriage, including its termination,
unenforceable in Alaska; however, this provision, along with the state's ban
on same-sex marriage, is unconstitutional under Hamby v. Parnel, which is
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit after stay was denied by the United States
Supreme Court.3O
2. Arkansas: Section 9-11-208 of the Arkansas Code makes
unenforceable in Arkansas the contractual rights attendant on a valid same-
sex marriage, including its termination.305
3. Georgia: The state's constitution states that courts of the state shall have
no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with regard to any
same-sex marriage.306
While the answer to whether a married same-sex couple can obtain a
divorce in any other nonrecognition state is an open question, one has to
assume the answer is likely to be no.0 Fortunately, several states that allow
same-sex couples to marry allow couples married in that state to seek a
divorce without the need to meet the usual jurisdictional predicates.3 0s
1. California: Section 2320(a) of the California Family Code does not
allow a judgment of dissolution of a marriage to be entered unless one of the
parties has been a resident of the state for six months and of the county in
which the proceeding is filed for three months.309 However, subsection (b)
creates an exception for same-sex marriages, even if neither of the parties is
a resident of or maintains a domicile in California, if the parties were married
in California and neither party resides in a jurisdiction that will dissolve the
marriage; if the jurisdiction will not recognize the marriage, there is a
rebuttable presumption that it will not dissolve it. 31o Venue is in the proper
court of the county where the marriage was celebrated and "[t]he dissolution,
303. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. granted).
304. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.05.013(a) (West 2013); Hamby v. Pamel, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D.C.
Alaska 2014).
305. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(a)(2) (West 2011).
306. GA. CONST. art. I, §4, ¶ I(b) (2004).
307. See Hayley Bruce, Same-Sex Couples 'Wed-Locked', THE GAZETTE (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/laws/same-sex-couples-wed-locked-same-sex-
couples-can-face-legal-headaches-when-seeking-divorce-in-states-not-recognizing-unions-2014-0411.
308. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320(a) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f) (West 2013);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-1 (West 2013).
309. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320(a).
310. Id. § 2320(b)(1).
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nullity, or legal separation shall be adjudicated in accordance with California
law." "3
2. Delaware: Title 13, section 129 of the Delaware Code states:
All persons who enter into same-gender marriages that are solemnized in
this State or are created by conversion from a civil union under the laws of
this State consent to the nonexclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court of
this State for all proceedings for divorce and annulment of such marriage,
even if 1 or both parties no longer reside in this State, as set forth in § 1504
of this title.3 12
However, section 1504 provides an exception to the six-month residence
requirement in the state in order to give jurisdiction over a divorce:
Notwithstanding the immediately preceding sentence, in addition to any
other basis for jurisdiction it may otherwise have, the Family Court of this
State has jurisdiction over all proceedings for divorce and annulment of
same-gender marriages that are solemnized in this State or created by
conversion of civil unions pursuant o the laws of this State, notwithstanding
that the domicile or residency of the petitioner and the respondent are not in
this State, if the jurisdiction of domicile or residency of the petitioner and/or
the respondent does not by law affirmatively permit such a proceeding to
be brought in the courts of that jurisdiction.313
The provision also requires that if neither of the parties to the marriage reside
in the state, the petition for divorce or annulment shall be brought in the
county in which one or both parties last resided.314 This last requirement
could be problematic for a couple who came to Delaware solely to marry
because it is unlikely either party ever resided in the state.
3. Hawai'i: Section 580-1(b) of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes creates an
exception to the usual requirement of six months residency in the state and
three months in the county where the action is brought if the couple was
married under Hawai'i law and neither party can pursue an action for divorce,
annulment, or separation in the domiciliary jurisdiction or jurisdic-
tions." There is a rebuttable presumption that an action cannot be
maintained if the domiciliary jurisdiction or jurisdictions do not recognize
the marriage.3 16 Under section 580-1(c), the action must be commenced in
the judicial circuit where the marriage was solemnized, and the law of
Hawai'i shall govern." Subsection (c) contains a further limitation:
311. Id. § 2320(b)(2).
312. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129(f).
313. Id. § 1504(a).
314. Id
315. HAw. REv. STAT. § 580-1(b) (West 2013).
316. Id.
317. Id. § 580-1(c).
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Jurisdiction over actions brought under subsection (b) shall be limited to
decrees granting annulment, divorce, or separation that address the status or
dissolution of the marriage alone; provided that if both parties to the
marriage consent to the family court's personal jurisdiction or ifjurisdiction
otherwise exists by law, the family court shall adjudicate child custody,
spousal support, child support, property division, or other matters related to
the annulment, divorce, or separation.8
4. Illinois: Effective June 1, 2014, when the Illinois Religious Freedom
and Marriage Fairness Act went into effect, the following new law also went
into effect:
§ 220. Consent to jurisdiction. Members of a same-sex couple who enter
into a marriage in this State consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State for the purpose of any action relating to the marriage, even if one or
both parties cease to reside in this State. A court shall enter a judgment of
dissolution of marriage if at the time the action is commenced, it meets the
grounds for dissolution of marriage set forth in this Act.319
5. Minnesota: Section 518.07(2) of the Minnesota Statutes creates an
exception to the usual requirement of residence or domicile for 180 days
immediately before the commencement of the proceeding for dissolution by
giving a Minnesota court jurisdiction of a proceeding to dissolve a same-sex
marriage if the marriage was performed in the state and neither party resides
in a jurisdiction that will dissolve the marriage.320 There is a rebuttable
presumption that a jurisdiction will not dissolve the marriage if the
jurisdiction will not recognize it.32' The action for dissolution must be
adjudicated according to Minnesota law.322
6. Vermont: Title 15, section 592(b) of the Vermont Statutes creates an
exception to the requirement in subsection (a) of six months residency before
the bringing of a complaint for divorce or annulment and residence for one
year before the date of final hearing if one meets the following:
(1) The marriage was established in Vermont.
(2) Neither party's state of legal residence recognizes the couple's Vermont
marriage for purposes of divorce.
(3) There are no minor children who were born or adopted during the
marriage.
(4) The parties file a stipulation together with a complaint that resolves all
issues in the divorce action. The stipulation shall be signed by both parties
and shall include the following terms:
318. Id.
319. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/220 (West 2014).
320. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07(2) (West 2013).
321. Id. § 578.07(2)(b).
322. See id.
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(A) An agreement hat the terms and conditions of the stipulation
may be incorporated into a final order of divorce.
(B) The facts upon which the court may base a decree of divorce
and that bring the matter before the court's jurisdiction.
(C) An acknowledgment hat:
(i) each party understands that if he or she wishes to litigate any
issue related to the divorce before a Vermont court, one of the
parties must meet he residency requirement set forth in subsection
(a) of this section.
(ii) neither party is the subject of an abuse prevention order in a
proceeding between the parties.
(iii) there are no minor children who were born or adopted during
the marriage.
(iv) neither party's state of legal residence recognizes the couple's
Vermont marriage for purposes of divorce.
(v) each party has entered into the stipulation freely and
voluntarily.
(vi) the parties have exchanged all financial information, including
income, assets, and liabilities.323
Subsection (c) provides:
The court shall waive a final hearing on any divorce action filed pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section unless the court determines upon review of the
complaint and stipulation that the filing is incomplete or that a hearing is
warranted for the purpose of clarifying a provision of the stipulation. Final
uncontested hearings in a nonresident divorce action shall be conducted by
telephone unless one or both of the parties choose to appear in person. 324
7. District of Columbia: Section 16-902(b) of the District of Columbia
Code creates an exception to the usual requirement of six months residence
in the District in order to give jurisdiction over a divorce if the parties to the
marriage are of the same sex, the marriage was performed in the District, and
neither party resides in a jurisdiction that will maintain an action for
divorce.3 25 The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the jurisdiction
of residence will not maintain the action for divorce if it does not recognize
the marriage.326 Finally, there is an express provision that the action must be
adjudicated in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia.3 2 7
323. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592(b) (West 2012).
324. Id. § 592(c).
325. D.C. CODE § 16-902(b) (2012).
326. Id.
327. Id. Note that this provision applies only to actions for divorce; subsection (c) provides that the
residence of the parties is irrelevant in a proceeding to annul a marriage performed in the District. Id
§ 16-902(c).
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The question then arises: Which state's provision is better for the same-
sex married couple who cannot be divorced in their state of residence? The
law of the state that has taken jurisdiction for purposes of the divorce action
will apply.328 This fact means that no choice can be safely made without
thorough knowledge of the domestic relations laws of these states,
knowledge that is beyond the scope of these materials. However, some basic
observations can be made safely.
First, of the states allowing nonresident divorces, only California is a
community property state.329 Generally, property accumulated while a
married couple does not reside in a community property jurisdiction is not
community property, unless on moving to a community property jurisdiction
their separate property is converted to community property by agreement.3 o
In California this process is called "transmutation."33 1 Under section 125 of
the Family Code quasi community property is defined as property acquired
"by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been
community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been
domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition."33 2 Moreover, community
estate is the community and quasi-community property, and the entire
community estate is divided between the spouses on divorce, except if there
is a written agreement providing otherwise or the parties agree in open court
to an oral stipulation.3 Seeking a divorce in California, therefore, will
require figuring out how much of the couples' property is quasi-community
property, and then, if an equal division is not desired, entering into a written
agreement binding under California law (the stipulation in open court may be
unlikely in the case of a nonresident divorce).3 34
Washington is a community property state, and it does not have a
residency requirement for jurisdiction in divorce; the statutes require only
that one party be a resident of the state, but the cases have interpreted resident
to mean domiciliary.33 s
Second, the remaining states are all common law title states, and as such
the division of property on divorce, at least in the absence of a binding
agreement, will be decreed under the state's version of "equitable
distribution," a concept foreign to community property states.3 6 Third, any
pre- or post-nuptial agreement must be binding under the law of the state
328. See, e.g., id. § 16-902(b)(3).
329. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2013).
330. Alvin Golden, An Overview of Community Property Law, IKARD GOLDEN JONES 16-17,
http://igjlaw.com/alvingolden articles/ACTECCP.pdf(last modified Feb. 29, 2012).
331. CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 2013).
332. Id. § 125.
333. Id §§ 63, 2550.
334. See id §§ 63, 2550.
335. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.040(1) (West 2008); Sasse v. Sasse, 249 P.2d 380 (1952); In
re Marriage of Strohmeier, 659 P.2d 534 (1983).
336. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (West 2013).
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taking jurisdiction. Fourth, serious planning for the possibility of dissolution
by divorce will require specialized knowledge of the law of the chosen state.
Fifth, a divorce is also necessary for favorable tax treatment for property
transfers between the spouses, both in planning for and after the divorce.337
IV. PLANNING FOR THE MARRIED COUPLE LIVING IN A NON-RECOGNITION
STATE
Once the newly married couple returns home to a state that will not
recognize their marriage, estate planning, in the broad sense, must be what it
always was-that is, aimed at getting the couple what they want in a local
legal framework that does not recognize their marriage.
In a state like Texas without state income or transfer taxes, tax planning
is the same as for any other married couple who is or might be subject to the
federal transfer taxes. Transfers between the spouses (so long as the donee
is a United States citizen) will not have federal gift tax complications.338
Because they are now a married couple for federal purposes, the special
valuation rules of section 2702 of the IRC will apply, and while before
marriage one partner could create a common law Grantor Retained Income
Trust (GRIT)-transferring property to a trust in which the transferor retains
the income for a period of time one hopes will end before the transferor's
death, remainder to the other partner, with the gift being the actuarially
calculated value of the remainder-after marriage, such a trust will have to
be in the form of a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) or Grantor
Retained Unitrust (GRUT).339 Note that if one of the, then, unmarried
partners did create a GRIT for the other, some part of the donor's unified
credit was used to offset the resulting gift tax.340 Now that the couple is
married, there would be no gift because of the marital deduction.34 1 Can the
donor spouse get back the unified credit used up in the creation of the GRIT?
Guidance from Treasury may be forthcoming.
The unlimited gift tax marital deduction will greatly simplify lifetime
planning. For example, if one of the spouses provides all of the consideration
for the acquisition of real property to which the couple takes title as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship, there will still be a gift of one-half the
value of the consideration to the noncontributing joint tenant, but who cares,
the marital deduction will wipe out the gift.342 In addition, of course, the
couple will be able to elect to "split" gifts made by one of them.3 43
337. I.R.C. §§ 1014(a)(2), 2516 (2012).
338. Id. § 2523.
339. Id. § 2702; Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702-1 (as amended in 1998), 25.2702-2 (as amended in 2005).
340. I.R.C. § 2505 (2012).
341. See id. § 2056.
342. See id
343. See id § 2513.
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Deathtime transfers will qualify for the federal estate tax marital
deduction.3" The "reverse QTIP election," will be available in the estate of
the first to die.345 The surviving spouse can make a qualified disclaimer of
property passing to him or her from the decedent even though retaining an
interest in the property.346 All of the couple's community property will
receive a new basis on the death of the first spouse to die (but if during their
marriage the couple resided in a community property state that did not
recognize their marriage it is unlikely that this provision will apply to what
the state would consider as community property had the state recognized the
marriage).3 47  The personal representative of the first to die can take
advantage of portability and give the decedent's unused applicable exclusion
amount to the surviving spouse.348
Income tax planning will be that applicable to any married couple. They
will have the choice of filing jointly or as married filing separately.349 If they
file jointly, they may have a marriage bonus or a marriage penalty.35 0 All of
the various income limits related to income tax calculation will apply to them
as a married couple, e.g., the amount of AGI relevant to the calculation of the
tax on net investment income for married couples filing jointly is
$250,000."' The couple will not be able to realize losses on capital property
one sells to the other.352 The grantor trust rules will treat a power held by the
grantor's spouse as held by the grantor.353 The survivor will be able to
rollover the decedent's IRAs into the survivor's own IRA, and so on.354
A. Property Law Aspects ofPlanning
If the state of residence does not recognize the couple's marriage, then
property law planning will be what it always has been for unmarried couples.
Because under the law of the state of residence there is no legal relationship
between the spouses, their estate plans are vulnerable to family members who
may or may not be hostile to the relationship because the family members,
not the spouse, will be the heirs and will, therefore, have standing to
challenge a will.355
344. Id. § 2056.
345. Id. § 2652(a)(3).
346. Id. § 2518(b)(4)(A).
347. Id. § 1014(b)(6).
348. Id. § 2010(c).
349. Id. § 1.
350. Id.
351. Id. § 1411(b).
352. Id. § 1041(a).
353. Id. § 672(e)(1).
354. Id. § 408.
355. See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 256.204, 22.018 (West 2014).
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The most common advice has always been to create nonprobate
property to at least minimize the possibility of a post-death contest.356
However, even if the surviving spouse is the beneficiary of every sort of
nonprobate property arrangement created by the decedent, there is always the
possibility of a contest involving challenges to the creation of the
arrangement-undue influence being perhaps the most common.357  For
those with sufficient wealth to make the arrangement practical, creating a
lifetime revocable trust in a jurisdiction that recognizes the marriage
governed by the law of that jurisdiction could be an excellent option,
although this may require a local trustee. The law of its situs of course
governs real property." Joint tenancy with rights of survivorship will
remove the property from the probate system on the death of the first to die,
and a transfer on death deed is also a possibility in some jurisdictions,
although like most lifetime arrangements those who would take the probate
estate in intestacy could challenge it."' It might be possible to hold real estate
in an LLC and then put the LLC interests into a lifetime trust, effectively
removing the real property from the probate system, and if the trust is subject
to the laws of a state that recognizes the marriage, the possibility of a
successful challenge is further decreased. Any employee benefit arrange-
ment governed by ERISA will have to treat the couple as married.6 0
B. Lifetime Considerations
The couple must be counseled to do everything possible to make sure
that their relationship will be respected.3 61 Powers of attorney running to
each other are often a necessity.3 6 2 Whatever needs to be done to insure that
each spouse can indeed make medical decisions for the other and have access
to a hospitalized or institutionalized spouse must be done.363
V. DRAFTING CHALLENGES POSED BY MARRIAGE EQUALITY
It is clear that once a same-sex marriage is recognized in a jurisdiction
or by the federal government all of the legal consequences of being married
356. See GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS WILLS AND ESTATES: CASES AND MATERIALS 334-35 (7th ed.
2015).
357. See id.
358. Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 STETSON L. REV. 257, 259 (1996).
359. See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 111.001 (West 2014).
360. See Technical Release No. 2013-04, DEP'T LABOr (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsal
newsroom/trl 3-04.html.
361. See Still Not Married: Estate Planning for Same-Sex Couples in Texas, CHRISTIANSEN DAVIS
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follow."* It is not as certain, however, that private documents like wills and
trusts are as easy to construe.
Gifts in wills and trusts to persons described as the spouse of another
person can arise in many contexts. One such context is an outright gift in a
will or on the termination of a trust (especially a revocable trust used as a will
substitute) to spouses of a named beneficiary, to the spouses of class
members, or as an alternative beneficiary should the primary beneficiary not
survive the testator or the date of termination of the trust.365 The following
are examples of each type of gift:
a) I give ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to my daughter, [name], and
her husband.
b) I give twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) to each of my children and
their spouses.
c) I give fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) to my son, [name], if he
shall survive me, and if he does not to his wife, [name].
Another context is lifetime beneficiaries of income or principal, or both;
for example, the trust instrument gives the trustee extended iscretion to
distribute income and principal to a class consisting of the settlor's
descendants and their spouses.366 A third context is as permissible appointees
of a power of appointment.3 67 For example,
a) On the termination of a trust for the lifetime benefit of the settlor's
surviving spouse, the trustee is directed to distribute the trust property
as the surviving spouse shall appoint among a class consisting of the
settlor's and the spouse's issue and their spouses; or
b) On the termination of a trust for a child the child may have a non-
general power to appoint outright or in trust to the child's surviving
spouse among others.
Wills and trusts can also make gifts to the settlor's or testator's spouse,
whether outright or in trust, and the spouse can be described by name, by
status, or perhaps most commonly, by both; for example, If my spouse
[name] shall survive me, I give the residue of my estate to my trustee
hereinafter named to hold in trust for the surviving spouse. It is believed, and
probably rightly, that the wills of married persons overwhelmingly make the
surviving spouse the principal beneficiary of the probate estate.368 It is likely
364. I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-72 (Aug. 29,2013).
365. 74 TEX. JUR. 3D Wills §§ 259-60 (2014).
366. 72 TEX. JUR. 3D Trusts § 118 (2014).
367. 59 TEX. JUR. 3D Powers § 1 (2014).
368. Texas Probate Passport: A Guide to Probate and Estate Planning in Texas, TEX. YOUNG LAW.
Ass'N 1 (2011), http://www.tyla.org/tyla/assets/file/38668TexasProbatePassport WebReady.pdf.
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that most wills of married persons will name their spouse, or at least contain
language that sets out existing family relationships: I am married to [name]
and all references to "my spouse" in this will are to [name].
VI. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS IN THE WILL OF THE PERSON MARRIED
TO A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX369
A. State Law Context
If the testator is a domiciliary of a state that allows same-sex couples to
marry, or at least recognizes the validity of same-sex marriages valid where
celebrated, traditional drafting practices will work just as well for the testator
whose spouse is of the same-sex as for the testator married to a different-sex
spouse. For example, a definitional provision like I am married to [name]
and all references to "my spouse" in this will are to [name], will effectively
define the person referred to as the testator's spouse no matter the sex of the
spouses.
In Texas, section 6.204(b) of the Texas Family Code states that a
marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union "is contrary to the
public policy of this state and is void in this state."3 70 In addition, section
6.204(c) states:
The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not give
effect to a: (1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates,
recognizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the same sex or a
civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction; or (2) right or claim to
any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a result of a
marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in
any other jurisdiction.371
The Texas Constitution states: "Marriage in this state shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman [and that] [t]his state or a political
subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical
or similar to marriage."372 Both the statute and the constitutional provision
were held to violate the equal protection guarantee of Amendment XIV to the
United Stated Constitution and, therefore, void in De Leon v. Perry.373
Given the Texas statutory and constitutional scheme, consider the
meaning of the following in the will of a testator who is married to a person
of the same sex: I am married to [name] and all references in this will to "my
369. These observations are made in the context of a will. They are equally applicable to a trust
created by a married person that includes the settlor's spouse as a beneficiary.
370. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(b), (c) (West 2013).
371. Id. § 6.204(c).
372. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32.
373. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
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spouse" are to [name]. Under Texas law, this sentence is a legal
impossibility.3 74 It could be taken to be either patently ambiguous, if the
name of the spouse makes it clear to the reader that the testator and the spouse
are the same sex, or latently ambiguous, if the fact that the spouse is the same
sex as the testator is not clear from the spouse's name (think of "I am married
to Terry Testator. . . ." Is "Terry" a nickname for Theresa or Terrence, or is
it the given name of the spouse?). In either event, if in a construction
proceeding a court were to hold that the provision did not identify the
testator's spouse, it is possible that any gift made in the will to the testator's
spouse would be held to be ineffective, which would cause all gifts to the
spouse to lapse, perhaps reducing the estate, or at least some part of it, to
intestacy.3 75
While invalidation of gifts to the testator's spouse in this circumstance
is clearly an extreme result, it is not unimaginable and the possibility makes
it necessary to carefully consider the wisdom of referring to the testator's
spouse as spouse. The will could still contain a provision stating that the
testator is married to the spouse, I am married to [name], but the second part
of the provision defining the meaning of my spouse should be omitted. That
means, of course, that all references to spouse would use the spouse's given
name.
Compare the first example, a typical clause disposing of the residuary
estate to the surviving spouse with the second, suggested for use in a state
that does not recognize the couple's marriage:
a) Instead of: I give the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal and wheresoever situated to my spouse [with or
without the addition of the name] if he shall survive, and if he does not
[whatever substitute gift the testator wishes to make]
b) The residuary gift would read: I give the rest, residue, and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal and wheresoever situated to [name],
if he shall survive me, and if he does not ...
An alternative that makes gifts in the will based on the marital
relationship relies on the ability of the testator or settlor to define terms as he
or she wishes: I am married to [name]. In this [will or trust] references to
"my spouse" are to [name] whether or not our marriage is recognized in the
jurisdiction in which the terms of this [will or trust] are to be effective or
carried out [or where this will is admitted to probate].
374. FAM. § 6.204; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32.
375. See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.512 (West 2014).
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B. Gifts to the Testator's Children and More Remote Descendants
We generally do not think very much about a gift in a will or trust to the
testator's or grantor's children or more remote descendants unless there are
questions related to adoption or nonmarital children. We assume that when
the testator or grantor is married a reference to my children includes the
children of the marriage.376 However, that is not necessarily the case where
the parents of the child are a married same-sex couple.
Consider the case Matter of Seb C-M where the same-sex spouse of the
child's genetic and birth mother filed a petition to adopt the child.377 Under
New York law the adoption was superfluous because the child's birth
certificate identified both spouses as the parents of the child." The surrogate
denied the petition because it was unnecessary, even though the court took
notice that in a jurisdiction that does not recognize the couple's marriage the
parent-child relationship between the petitioner and the child might not be
recognized, resting as it does on the marriage.37
Assume the parents of Seb C-M and the child do indeed move to a state
that does not recognize the marriage. The couple has valid New York wills
that give the estate of the first to die to the survivor and on the death of the
survivor, to "my children" or "my descendants by representation" or in any
way that relies on the parent-child relationship between the spouses and the
child. The wills are never changed, but being valid under the law of New
York makes them valid under the law of the domiciliary jurisdiction.3 80 If
the nongenetic and birth parent is not the second spouse to die, the gift in the
will of the other spouse to "children" or "descendants" will include Seb C-M
only if the New York birth certificate is sufficient to create the parent-child
relationship in the nonrecognition state, and the answer to that question is
uncertain.
The will of the spouse who may or may not be the child's parent must
identify the child in some way that does not rest on the marriage. For
example, a definition of children might read: I am married to [name] and with
[name] have raised [name's] child [child's name] since [his or her] birth. All
references to my children in this will are to [child's name].
It might be better still to define descendants o that the child's children
and more remote descendants will be included in the will: I am married to
[name] and with [name] have raised [name's] child [child's name] since [his
or her] birth. All references to "my descendants" in this will are to [child's
name] and [his or her] descendants.
376. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.201, 160.204 (West 2013).
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These suggestions have one glaring flaw: they do not take into account
the possibility of the couple having more children. The usual approach to
dealing with the possibility is to define children to include those named and
"all children hereafter born to or adopted by me."381 That would work in the
will of the spouse who is the biological and birth parent of the future children
but not in the will of the other spouse, unless adoption is indeed possible
(which it may be, at the price of cutting off the parental rights of the birth
parent).3 82 In addition, a pretermitted child statute will not apply to the will
of the nonbiological parent because, of course, the children born after the
execution of the will are not that person's children.383 The best solution is to
execute new wills if additional children are born, but we know that no matter
how important the event estate planning documents are often not brought up
to date.
Needless to say, the spouses in Matter ofSeb C-M were both women.384
A male same-sex married couple is in a different situation because while one
of the spouses can be the biological father of the child, neither of them can
be the birth parent; they will have to rely on a surrogate to bear the child. The
nonbiological parent may have to become a parent by second-parent adoption
of the spouse's child, if that is possible under state law.8 Adoption will not
be necessary if state law provides a proceeding that establishes the parentage
of the couple who contracted with the surrogate.8 However, in Texas
"intended parents" who are parties to a gestational agreement must be
married to each other.387 In both cases, a state that does not recognize the
couple's marriage may not recognize the second-parent adoption or the
confirmation of the couple's parentage if the basis for the recognition is the
marriage.8 Drafting for nonrecognition of the nonbiological parent's
relationship is the same as that suggested above.
VII. IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THIRD PERSONS
The parents and other relatives of the validly married same-sex couple
may or may not be pleased by their child's or other relative's marriage. We
381. See 2 EDwARD KOREN, ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING § 18:68 (2014).
382. Realize that this usual approach works only because of the strong presumption that children born
during marriage are the children of both spouses. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § § 160.201, 160.204 (West
2013).
383. See TEx. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 255.051-56 (West 2014).
384. Matter ofSeb C-M, NYLJ 1202640083455, at *1.
385. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-119 (West 2010).
386. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(f) (West 2014); In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005)
(describing the California procedure and recognizing its effect with reference to a New York trust on
comity grounds).
387. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West 2013).
388. See Adoption by LGBTParents, NAT'L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS. (2015), http://www.nchights.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2PAstate list.pdf.
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need to consider strategies for both including and excluding the relationships
created by the marriage in the estate plans of persons other than the spouses.
A. Drafting to Include a Child's Same-Sex Spouse and the Offspring of the
Marriage
The person who wishes to include same-sex spouses in gifts and
references to the spouses of beneficiaries of the will or trust could define
spouse with this provision: The term spouse means any person validly
married to another person under the law of the jurisdiction where the
marriage was celebrated whether or not the spouse and the other person are
or at some time were of the same sex or different sex and whether or not any
jurisdiction where the spouse and the other person are domiciled or reside
recognizes their marriage as valid.
A person who wishes to exclude same-sex spouses could define spouse
with this provision: The term spouse means any person validly married to
another person who is not the same sex as the spouse whether or not any
jurisdiction where the spouse and the other person are domiciled or reside
recognizes as valid marriages between persons of the same sex.
A testator or settlor who wishes to be as inclusive as possible should
consider including in the term spouse a person in a civil union or other
"marriage equivalent" with another person: The term spouse means any
person validly married to another person under the law of the jurisdiction
where the marriage was celebrated and any person who with another person
has entered into an legal relationship which under the law of jurisdiction
where the relationship was entered into gives the parties to the arrangement
the legal status of spouses (a "marriage equivalent") whether or not any
jurisdiction where the spouse and the other person are domiciled or reside
recognizes their marriage or their marriage equivalent as valid.
B. Drafting to Include or Exclude the Offspring of a Same-Sex Marriage
Many wills and trusts include gifts to the "issue" or "descendants" of
the testator, settlor, or of other persons whether or not they themselves are
beneficiaries. In the modem world, the default rules applicable to class gifts
in wills, trusts, and other instruments that refer to issue, descendants, heirs,
and other similar terms include in those gifts both nonmarital and adopted
children on the same basis as children born within marriage in one case and
born to the parent or parents in the other. 9 There are numerous examples of
language that is designed to include or exclude nonmarital and adopted
389. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.202 (no discrimination based on marital status), 162.017(c)
("The terms 'child,' 'descendant,' 'issue,' and other terms indicating the relationship of parent and child
include an adopted child unless the context or express language clearly indicates otherwise.").
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children from participation in class gifts.390 Drafting language to include or
exclude children who are related through a same-sex marriage to a testator,
settlor, or other creator of any other donative instrument from class gifts in
those instruments is a challenge.
The following is an example of a provision for broad inclusion of
adopted children: I direct that any child or children now or hereafter adopted
by any issue of mine be treated, in all respects and for all purposes of this
will, as though the said adopted child or children were the child or children
of the blood of my issue. This language is comprehensive enough to include
adoption of the children of a spouse of any of the testator's issue. A
frequently seen provision in a clause like this limits the inclusive treatment
of adopted persons to persons who were adopted before they reached a stated
age, who lived as minors with the adoptive parent, or both.3 9'
The following is an example of a provision for broad inclusion of
children who are children of the testator's issue by reason of blood, adoption,
a legal declaration or judgment of parentage, or marriage to the other parent:
Whenever in my will I make a disposition of property to persons described
therein as a child, children, issue, descendants, or heirs or by any term of like
import, I intend to include all children whether their relationship to their
parents or parent is created by blood, adoption, a legally binding declaration
or judgment of parentage, or the marriage between the child's legal parents
whether or not the parents are or have been of the same or different sex.39 2
The following is an example of a provision for inclusion of adopted
children and exclusion of children whose parentage is the result of the
marriage between the parent and the parent's same-sex spouse: I direct that
any child or children now or hereafter adopted by any issue of mine be
treated, in all respects and for all purposes of this will, as though the said
adopted child or children were the child or children of the blood of my issue,
except those children whose status as children of the blood is the result of a
marriage between one of my issue and a person of the same-sex.
C. Gifts Conditioned on Marriage
Some testators and settlors may wish to encourage their beneficiaries to
marry the "right person," at least the right person in the eyes of the donor.
The most well-known cases involve religious restrictions on marriage; the
most recent to be widely noticed, and an unusual one in that it involves
390. See, e.g., Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 880-81 (1986) (discussing the precise meaning of
"heirs of the body").
391. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(f) (amended 2010) (providing that when construing a gift by
someone who is not the adoptive parent, a child is not a child of the adoptive parent unless the adoption
took place before the adopted person reached eighteen years of age, the adoptive parent was the adopted
person's stepparent or foster parent, or the adoptive parent "functioned as a parent" of the adopted person
before the adopted person attained eighteen years of age).
392. See id § 2-705(b) (equating all potential relationships between parent and child).
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restrictions in a trust, is In re Estate ofFeinberg.393 The case involved trusts
created by Max Feinberg for the benefit of his widow, Erla, for life and then
for the benefit of his grandchildren for their lives.394 The trust terms
contained a condition on the grandchildren's interests: any grandchild who
married outside the Jewish faith or whose non-Jewish spouse did not convert
to Judaism within one year of marriage was deemed to have died as of the
date of the marriage and that person's interest would pass to Max and Erla's
two children.395 The trusts for the grandchildren, however, were takers in
default of Erla's exercise of a lifetime nongeneral power of appointment, the
permissible objects of which were Max's descendants.3 9 6
During her life Erla exercised the power to give $250,000 from the trust
at her death to each of her two children and to any grandchild not deemed
deceased under the condition contained in the trusts.97 At the time of Erla's
death all of the grandchildren had been married for more than one year but
only one had fulfilled the condition included in the trusts.3 98 One of the
grandchildren sued the executors of Max's and Erla's estates for violation of
their fiduciary duties (the executors were the son, daughter, and son-in-law
of Max and Erla) and the executors moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
grandchild was not a beneficiary because she had failed to fulfill the
condition.3 99
The trial court held the condition invalid and a bitterly divided
intermediate appellate court affirmed.400 The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, unanimously finding the condition to be valid and not contrary to
the public policy of Illinois "[b]ecause no grandchild had a vested interest in
the trust assets and because the distribution plan adopted by Erla has no
prospective application."401
This narrow and fact specific holding leaves open the possibility that
some conditions involving religious restraints on the marriage choices of
beneficiaries would be void. This conclusion is reinforced by the court's
discussion of the reliance by the majority below on section 29, comment j,
illustration 3 in Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which involves a trust for the
settlor's nephew, N, from which he receives discretionary payments before
age eighteen and then all of the income until age thirty at which time the trust
terminates and N is to receive all of the trust property outright.402 The trust
393. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (2009), cert. denied sub nom., Trull v. Feinberg, 560
U.S. 939 (2010).




398. Id. at 892.
399. Id
400. Id.
401. Id. at 905.
402. See id. at 902; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j, illus. 3 (2003).
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terms state that if N marries someone who is not of R religion before the age
of thirty all his rights terminate and the trust property is to be distributed to a
named educational institution.403  The illustration says the restraint is
invalid.404 The Illinois high court said whether the conclusion in the
illustration is correct or not, and although the facts are very much like the
provisions of the trusts created by Max Feinberg, Erla Feinberg's exercise of
her power of appointment makes it inapplicable to the instant case because
under the exercise of the power of appointment the restraint is a condition
precedent, rather than a condition subsequent hat would most likely be
invalid.405
One important message, and one which authorities agree, is that when it
comes to conditioning the receipt of a gift in a will or trust on marriage to the
"right" person, conditions precedent are generally valid and conditions
subsequent are not.406 That is, if the beneficiary is unmarried at the time of
the testator's death or of the distribution from the trust, conditioning the gift
on a future marriage can be enforceable, but a condition that takes away a
gift that has already been received is not.407 It is also clear that a condition
that requires the beneficiary to divorce cannot be enforced on public policy
grounds.4 08
The reporter's note to comment j presents more detail, discussing cases
that generally have focused on the probable effect of such provisions and not
the motivation behind them, an approach that tends to diminish the chances
of invaliding such provisions.409 A classic example is In re Estate ofDonner,
which upheld a provision under which income distributions to the settlor's
daughter would begin at age sixty-five unless her husband should die, or they
should divorce sooner.410 The court found a reasonable economic basis for
the provision even though it could be read as encouraging divorce.411 An
older, but very similar example, is Hunt v. Carroll, where the court upheld a
provision withholding income distributions for a minimum of twenty years
from the testator's daughter if her marriage to her current husband
continued.4 12
Be that as it may, it is likely that the courts of a state that recognizes
same-sex marriage would strike down a condition that required the
403. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j, illus. 3.
404. See id.
405. See Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 902-03.
406. See id. at 903.
407. See id
408. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (stating that conditions tending "to encourage
disruption of a family relationship or to discourage formation or resumption of such a relationship" are
contrary to public policy and void).
409. Id.
410. In re Estate of Donner, 623 A.2d 307, 308 (1993).
411. See id. at 308-09.
412. Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W.2d429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism'd).
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beneficiary to divorce the beneficiary's same-sex spouse. The courts of a
nonrecognition state would seem to be faced by a quandary. If the public
policy of the state insists that marriage is limited to one man and one woman,
can one enforce a condition that requires the dissolution of a marriage that
does not exist, especially if the beneficiary is a resident of that state or of
another nonrecognition state?
Conditioning the gift on getting married within a period of time from
the testator's death or the termination of a trust to anyone not of the same-
sex as the beneficiary presents difficult questions. Because of its inclusion
in popular casebooks, the most well-known case involving a religious
restraint coupled with a time limit is Shapira v. Union National Bank.4 13 In
this case, the father's will conditioned the gift of one-third of the residue to
each of his two sons (his third child was a daughter) on their being married
within seven years of his death to "a Jewish girl both of whose parents were
Jewish," with a gift over to the State of Israel.4 14 The younger son, who was
twenty-one years of age and unmarried at his father's death, sued to overturn
the restriction.4 15 The court upheld the restriction, not surprisingly finding
that the provision did not implicate freedom of religion or the right to marry,
or indeed any constitutionally protected right the son might have had, because
not only did he not have a right to inherit from his father but state action was
not involved.4 16 The court also found no violation of public policy; the
restriction did not unduly limit the son's choices (there was no dearth of
Jewish women of appropriate age) in the Youngstown, Ohio area where the
son lived, seven years was sufficient time, and forfeiture was not involved
because there was a gift over.4 17
What is the probable fate of a provision in a will that parallels the
condition in the Shapira will but instead of a religious restriction requires the
beneficiary to marry within seven years of the testator's death of a person of
a different sex?418 That is an open question for now.
D. Construction ofExisting Instruments Making Gifts to Spouses
As noted above, wills, trusts, and other donative instruments often make
gifts on the basis of who is married to whom.4 19 In a jurisdiction that allows
same-sex couples to marry, instruments executed after the date such
marriages may be validly performed in the jurisdiction are most likely to be
construed to include a same-sex spouse in the term spouse. It is also possible
413. Shapira v. Union Nat'1 Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pl. 1974).
414. Id. at 829.
415. Id. at 827.
416. Id. at 828.
417. Id. at 832.
418. Id
419. See supra Part IV.
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that the courts of a jurisdiction that recognized the validity of same-sex
marriages validly celebrated elsewhere before allowing same-sex marriages
to be celebrated in the jurisdiction would construe a reference to spouse in an
instrument executed after the recognition date to include a spouse of the same
sex. Such a construction presumably can be overcome by evidence of the
donor's intent, at least where it is admissible.
Far more uncertain is the construction of instruments executed before
the recognition or legalization dates. There are possible parallels to the way
courts approach the question of including adopted persons in class gifts made
in instruments of persons other than the adoptive parent or parents.420 Many
United States jurisdictions began by excluding adopted children from class
gifts in instruments of adoptive relatives other than their parents, applying
the "stranger to the adoption rule."4 2' One could argue that gifts to persons
described as spouses of another in instruments executed before the
legalization of same-sex marriage should be construed the same way-that
is, either to flatly exclude same-sex spouses or to exclude or include on the
basis of the intent of the creator of the instrument, with the usual
complications involved in allowing or forbidding the use of extrinsic
evidence to show that intent.
However, marriage is not quite adoption. While adoption was
"unknown to the common law" and completely a creature of statute, marriage
has been around for a very long time and the concept of spouse is equally
old.422 While bringing a child into a family by adoption, rather than birth,
was once novel and exceptional, marrying and acquiring a spouse is anything
but novel, even though the legal consequences of marriage have changed
greatly over the centuries.423 It is possible that a court sitting in ajurisdiction
that recognizes same-sex marriages as valid would construe the term spouse
in an instrument to mean any person married to another person, no matter
when the instrument was executed.
The constructional problems created by the legalization of same-sex
marriage will work themselves out through litigation or perhaps legislation
in the years to come. In the meantime, now that same-sex marriage is
possible but not recognized as valid everywhere in the United States, drafting
should address the issues.
420. See, e.g., In re Trust Under Agreement of Vander Poel, 933 A.2d 628 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
421. Seeidat634.
422. See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children: A
Counterhistory ofAdoption Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 263, 266 (2002).
423. See id
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APPENDIX A
Legal Relationships for Social Security Purposes
Relationship Inheritance
State Type Rights Development Effective Date
AZ Domestic No [n/a na
p artnesihip
AZ Civi union o fn/a n/a
CA Domestic Yes Request the date the January 1, 2000
partnership domestic partnership
was entered into.
D esignated Yes, unless (1) Request the dae July 1, 2009
beneficiary specifically the designated
(DB) excluded in beneficiary agreement
the DB was signed, and (2)
agreement ask if the right to
























Yes equest he date the October 1, 2005
civil union was October 1,
entered into. 2010
Yes Request the date the January 1, 2012
civil union was - July 1, 2014
ntered into.
Yes Request the date the January 26, 2006
domestic partnership
was registered.
es Request the date the June 1, 1997-
certificate of RB was December 2,
issued. 2013
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f [Relationship Ineritance
State Type Rights




























Request the date the January 1, 2012
civil union was
entered into.
Request the date the June 1, 2011
civil union was
entered into.





Request he date the October 1, 2009
domestic partnership
was registered.
Request the date the January 1, 2008
civil union was - December 31,
entered into. 2009
Request the date of July 10, 2004 -
the affidavit of February 19,
domestic partnership. 2007
Request the date the February 19,











Yes Request he date of February 4, 2008
the certificate of
domestic partnership.
Yes Request the date the June 1, 2011 -
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Relationship Inheritance
State Type Rights Development Effective Date
VT Civil union Yes Request the date the July 1, 2000 -
civil union was September 1,
entered into. 12009
VT Reciprocal No n/a n/a
beneficiary o n
WA Domestic Yes Request the date the July 22, 2007
partnership domestic partnership
w as registered. _ _ _ , 0
Fw-i Domestic Yes Request the date of August 3, 2009
partnership the declaration of
domestic partnership.
a
